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Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

Situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran*

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the General Assembly the report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ahmed Shaheed, submitted in accordance with Human Rights Council resolution 22/23, in which the Council extended the mandate of the Special Rapporteur for the second time.

The present report does not detail all of the violations of human rights in the country reported to the Special Rapporteur, but does provide an overview of the prevailing human rights situation, with a focus on systemic issues that pose obstacles to the ability of the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply with its international human rights obligations.

* The present report was submitted after the deadline as a result of consultations with the Member State.

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Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran

I. Introduction

1. The human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to warrant serious concern, with no sign of improvement in the areas previously raised by the General Assembly or the various human rights monitoring mechanisms. This includes progress in advancing commitments accepted by the Government during its 2010 universal periodic review. Tensions between various aspects of the country's laws and its human rights obligations, along with the capricious application of those laws, remain causes of the lack of progress. As a result, gender discrimination, as well as systemic and systematic violations of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, continue to characterize the human rights situation in the country.

2. Perfunctory cooperation with the United Nations human rights mechanisms engenders further concern about the compliance of the Islamic Republic of Iran with its human rights obligations, and insufficient transparency continues to impede attempts to further ascertain the extent and nature of the country's human rights situation. In its comments on the present report, the Government asserted its cooperation with the United Nations human rights mechanisms, highlighting the fact that it is a signatory of a number of international human rights treaties, has participated in its 2010 universal periodic review, during which it accepted 123 recommendations, has engaged in two treaty body reviews in the past two years and has provided responses to communications transmitted by the special procedures mechanisms.

3. The Government responded to 8 of the 28 joint communications transmitted by the special procedures mechanisms in 2012 and remains reticent on a number of their requests to visit the country. The Government has failed to respond to 12 communications issued by the Special Rapporteur since January 2013, including 3 allegation letters, 9 urgent appeals and a number of questionnaires transmitted to several ministries to further ascertain the impact of sanctions.

4. The Special Rapporteur reviewed information from 137 interviews that either corroborate or refute reports submitted by human rights organizations and defenders. The Government provided a 52-page commentary on the present report, which is referred to throughout this document.

5. The Special Rapporteur is pleased to have been granted a meeting with Mohsen Naziri Asl, Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office at Geneva, on 26 September, and hopes that there will be more opportunities for dialogue with the Iranian authorities. He renews his call for the Islamic Republic of Iran to engage with the United Nations human rights mechanisms in a meaningful and constructive manner, including by admitting him to the country. The Special Rapporteur also welcomes the release of a number of prisoners of conscience, including Nasrin Sotoudeh, a prominent human rights activist and lawyer, on 18 September, and calls upon the Government to build on this positive development by releasing hundreds of other prisoners detained solely for exercising their freedom of expression, association and assembly.

II. Freedom of expression, access to information and association

6. A number of Iranian laws and policies, including the 1986 Press Law, the 2009 Computer Crimes Law and the 2010 Cybercrime Law, continue to flagrantly violate the right to freedom of expression and access to information under international law. Also of concern are reports that the Government considers 600 Iranian journalists to be part of an anti-State network, that it has stated that journalists are arrested to prevent them from engaging in "seditious activities" and that the Government broadened the scope of sanctioned expression in February 2013 to include online content that either encouraged boycotts of the 2013 presidential election or mocked its candidates. In its comments, the Government asserts that freedoms are determined on the basis of their conformity with Islamic standards and that elected officials establish laws through a democratic process and therefore they do not violate freedom of expression or access to information. The Special Rapporteur continues to underscore that restrictions on the freedom of expression must be unambiguous, narrow and coupled with adequate safeguards against abuse.

7. Some 67 Internet cafes were reportedly closed in July 2013, authorities have reportedly announced that up to 5 million websites are blocked, and in April 2013 officials estimated that some 1,500 "anti-religious websites", such as those containing pro-Wahhabi or Baha'i content, are blocked per month, as well as those dedicated to news, music and women's rights, web pages maintained by ethnic minorities and social media sites.

8. At least 40 journalists, as well as 29 bloggers and online activists, are reportedly serving sentences in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and at least 23 journalists have reportedly been arrested since January 2013 (see figure I). This includes the arrest of 15 journalists between 25 and 27 January, the largest mass arrest of journalists in the country since 2009, as well as the arrest of 8 journalists on 6 and 7 March. All 40 journalists currently serving prison sentences were convicted for either national security crimes or crimes of a political nature, with 18 being convicted for "spreading propaganda against the State".

Figure I
Journalists imprisoned in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2004-2013



9. Seven individuals were reportedly sentenced for crimes associated with their roles as lawyers and administrators of Majzooban Noor, a community news website that covered human rights abuses against members of the Dervish community. Their prison sentences range from 7.5 to 10.5 years for crimes including "organizing an

illegal group with the intent to disturb national security" and "propaganda against the regime". Sources reported that as at 18 July, the defendants had refused to submit an appeal as a form of protest against unfair trial standards, including inadequate access to legal counsel. It was also reported that a conservative blogger, Mojtaba Daneshtalab, who was detained on 9 April 2013, received a six-month prison sentence and was fined on charges of insulting the Supreme Leader and other Iranian authorities as a result of critical comments he allegedly posted on his blog.

10. Journalists Khosro and Massoud Kordpour were arrested in March 2013 and charged with *moharebeh* (enmity against God), *mofsid-fil-arz* (corruption on earth), propaganda against the system, insulting the Supreme Leader and propagating falsehoods. Massoud Kordpour asserted his innocence and maintained that providing analysis or stating opinions about the problems in Kurdistan was not a criminal act during the first session of his trial, in August 2013. In its commentary, the Government accused the journalists of cooperating with terrorist groups but stopped short of identifying charges related to terrorism.

11. Furthermore, the director of Radio Farda, Ahmad Mostofi, reported that in May 2013 at least nine incidents occurred in which family members of Radio Farda staff were interrogated and pressured to persuade their relatives to cease doing reporting work and, in some cases, to spy on their relatives. The Special Rapporteur also received reports of the continued harassment and pressuring of family members of journalists, particularly those who work for or with foreign outlets, particularly BBC Persian.

12. The Special Rapporteur examined a study that investigated access to Persian-language articles on the popular open-source encyclopedia, Wikipedia. The study revealed that 964 Persian-language articles on a wide range of topics are effectively blocked in the Islamic Republic of Iran (see figure II). These and other websites are apparently blocked through the use of either keyword filters that work to impede access based on text in the web address (URL) or by specifically blocking a site. Keyword filtering is also seemingly responsible for restricted access to numerous Wikipedia articles that discuss sexual health, anatomy or bodily functions in a scientific or public health manner, including articles on safe sex and reproductive organs.

Figure II
Wikipedia sites blocked in the Islamic Republic of Iran, by topic



13. Artificial limits placed on Internet connection speed, often called throttling, have also been reported (see figure III). The average user speed in the Islamic Republic of Iran reportedly fell by more than 70 per cent in the days following the announcement of presidential candidates vetted by the Guardian Council through election day. On 25 June the Minister for Communications and Information Technology reported that the reduction of Internet speed during the 2013 election period was the result of security measures taken to preserve calm in the country.

Figure III
Average connection speed, in megabits per second, January-June 2013



14. The Special Rapporteur remains concerned about ongoing violations of the right to freedom of association through the use of overly broad public order and national security laws, resulting in ongoing bans on certain political parties as well as the persecution of human rights defenders conducting peaceful activities to advance human rights or provide humanitarian assistance to Iranian communities. It has been estimated that at least 500 human rights defenders are being detained in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This includes the ongoing detention of more than a dozen labour rights activists and approximately 15 student rights activists, who are all serving prison sentences of five years or more for the peaceful advocacy of workers' and students' rights.

15. The Special Rapporteur has also received reports about the ongoing detention of at least 30 aid workers allegedly arrested in connection with their work to provide shelter and supplies to victims of the August 2012 earthquake in east Azerbaijan. Those individuals were reportedly charged with such crimes as participation in assembly and collusion to commit a crime against national security and participation in posing a public health threat, and at least three of the aid workers were reportedly sentenced to over two years in prison.

III. Administration of justice

A. Legal developments

16. The Special Rapporteur welcomes the Government's decision to suspend deliberation on the Bill of Formal Attorneyship raised in his previous reports (see A/67/369), and encourages the Government to consider its withdrawal. The bill would increase government supervision over the Iranian Bar Association, severely undermining its independence and possibly undermining the likelihood of fair trials.

17. The Special Rapporteur is also deeply disturbed by amendments to article 27 of the Custodianship Bill currently under review in the Parliament (Majles) that would allow a custodian to marry his adopted child if it is deemed to be "in the best interest of the child". This amendment would seemingly serve to undermine the welfare of the girl child who is forced to marry her legal guardian. In a June 2013 communication with the Special Rapporteur, the Organization for Defending Victims of Violence, which describes itself as a non-governmental, non-profit, non-political organization in the Islamic Republic of Iran, reported that under Iranian law, no legal relations, as in the case of a natural child, is established between the adopter and the adoptee, so therefore, under religious jurisprudence and legally, there are no obstacles in the way of marriage. In addition, the Special Rapporteur notes that another amendment to the bill, which would allow for inter-faith adoption to take place in the event that applicants from a non-Muslim child's own religion were unavailable, was struck, potentially undermining articles 2 and 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, in which discrimination against children is prohibited and actions taken by social welfare institutions are required to be in the best interests of the child.

18. Furthermore, despite the recent endeavour to amend the country's Islamic Penal Code, concerns previously raised by international bodies persist.[1] For example, the Penal Code continues to consider some "crimes" not meeting the "most serious" standards under international law to be capital offences. These include adultery, drug trafficking, homosexual acts, recidivist alcohol consumption and insulting Islamic prophets. The new code also continues to use overly broad and vaguely worded national security laws under which authorities can prosecute, convict and sentence political dissidents for protected activities. Moreover, the code appears to expand the categories and definitions of national security crimes to include "armed rebellion", "sowing corruption" and "damaging the economy of the country". Lastly, the Penal Code retains stoning as a method of execution for individuals convicted of adultery, retains amputation and crucifixion for other crimes, such as "enmity against God", and continues to allow for the execution of juveniles.

B. Prison conditions

19. The Special Rapporteur is concerned about reports related to the medical conditions of six prisoners who are allegedly being denied access to necessary external medical care, in violation of international law and standards requiring adequate nutrition and medical attention, prohibiting torture and cruel, inhuman or

[1] The Islamic Penal Code was reportedly approved by the Guardian Council on 27 April 2013.

degrading treatment or punishment and requiring that prisoners be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.[2]

20. Furthermore, recent reports from former prisoners of Bandar Abbas, Evin, Karoun, Mahabad and Rajai Shahr prisons describe extremely poor conditions for all detainees. Interviewees continue to describe severe overcrowding, limited access to sanitation facilities and medical treatment, inadequate nutritional provisions and insufficient segregation of individuals convicted of violent crimes and those convicted of protected activities or otherwise non-violent acts.[3] For example, it was reported that some prisoners regularly go four to six months without adequate access to fruit, protein and other necessary nutrients and that prisoners in Bandar Abbas prison are now required to buy sugar, protein, dairy foods, eggs, cooking oil and medications, which are reportedly prohibitively expensive for many prisoners.

21. In its comments, the Islamic Republic of Iran maintains that efforts to improve prison conditions, including in nutritional and sanitation standards, have been undertaken; that the mistreatment of prisoners is prohibited; and that prison officials have been appropriately trained in that regard. The Special Rapporteur reasserts his desire to visit the country to observe the results of those efforts and to further investigate the aforementioned allegations about prison conditions.

C. Executions

22. Of particular alarm are reports that some 724 executions took place between January 2012 and June 2013; of those, 202 were reportedly carried out in the first half of 2013, 135 of which were officially announced by the Government (see figure IV). The majority of executions in the Islamic Republic of Iran continue to be related to drug-trafficking cases, including a number of public executions. Some 786 executions, in violation of international law, have been reported for drug trafficking since the Special Rapporteur began monitoring the human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Figure IV
Executions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2004-2013



[2] See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 10, and United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 1955.

[3] Based on interviews with current or former prisoners in the Islamic Republic of Iran, conducted and submitted to the Special Rapporteur between 24 December 2012 and 30 June 2013.

23. In its comments, the Government notes that no global consensus on the use of capital punishment exists; reasserts its belief that drug trafficking constitutes a serious crime; and states that the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has highlighted its appreciation for the country's efforts on several occasions. While drug trafficking represents a major challenge, the international consensus is that it does not constitute a capital crime.

24. The Special Rapporteur therefore strongly urges the Government to reconsider laws that define drug-related crimes as capital offences. He also encourages all stakeholders, including the United Nations, to further integrate human rights and humanitarian perspectives into all aspects of its technical assistance and programming measures in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including by expanding UNODC capacity-building initiatives aimed at prison and judicial reform and ensuring that aid or assistance used for the training of border guards who are responsible for the arrest of drug traffickers ultimately sentenced to death does not contribute to violations of international law.

25. Deeply disturbing reports of secret executions at Vakilabad prison in Mashhad, including reports that hundreds of Afghan citizens are being executed for drug trafficking, have been communicated. According to human rights groups and informed sources, five or more executions were carried out in the prison two or three times per week between October 2012 and February 2013. On 9 July 2013, the Afghan Embassy in the Islamic Republic of Iran reported the execution of 12 Afghan nationals in Karj and Esfahan allegedly for drug-related offences. Other reports indicate that at least 80 bodies of more than 100 Afghan citizens executed for drug trafficking have been returned to small villages along the Afghan-Iranian border in the past six months and that an estimated 4,000 Afghan citizens are currently on death row for drug-related crimes. The Government of Afghanistan has urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to halt or suspend the execution of Afghans.

26. Also of particular concern are the summary executions of Afghan citizens who attempt to illegally cross into the Islamic Republic of Iran. On 10 May 2013, for instance, Iranian border guards reportedly opened fire on Afghan refugees who attempted to cross into the country. According to various accounts, between 5 and 10 Afghans were killed and nearly 15 were injured when guards allegedly opened fire on a group of 150 to 300 Afghans after ordering them to halt. Some of the deceased were returned to Afghan authorities, although some sources suggest that a number of bodies remain in the Islamic Republic of Iran. An Afghan national border police commander has been arrested for his involvement in facilitating the crossing.

27. Furthermore, the General Assembly raised concern about the escalation in the rate of executions during the months following the 2009 elections (resolution 64/176, para. 3). The Special Rapporteur is alarmed by the spate of executions observed in the weeks following the 2013 elections, during which 38 officially announced and at least 44 unofficially announced executions reportedly took place. An analysis of data on execution announcements submitted to the Special Rapporteur demonstrates that a drop in the officially announced executions appeared to take place during election months, the Persian New Year and the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Conversely, peaks in the execution announcements seemingly coincide with anniversaries of mass dissent, such as the 1999 "student uprisings" and the anniversary of 14 February 2011, during which former candidates Mehdi Karroubi and Mir-Hossein Mousavi were arrested.

C. Other forms of cruel and inhuman punishment

28. In 1997, the Human Rights Committee equated flogging, amputation, and stoning with torture, rendering those punishments incompatible with human rights standards. The Special Rapporteur is perturbed by reports about sentences of limb amputation for the crime of theft and by reports about the flogging of 123 individuals between 1 July 2012 and 30 June 2013 for such crimes as "sedition", "acts incompatible with chastity", drinking alcohol, "illicit" relationships and non-penetrative homosexual acts. An equally disturbing report issued by the Iran State News Agency (ISNA) stated that 10,814 flogging sentences were implemented in the Mazandaran Province alone over the course of eight months in 2012. Those concerns are further compounded by reports that a machine was built and installed in a public square in January 2013 to expedite the amputation process.

D. Impunity

29. The Special Rapporteur remains deeply concerned about the lack of progress made in the case of Sattar Beheshti, a blogger who was allegedly tortured to death while in custody in November 2012. In June 2013, family members reported that despite repeated requests for an official investigation into Mr. Beheshti's death, no known legal action has been pursued to date.

30. The Special Rapporteur is also perturbed by the Government's lack of progress in addressing concerns raised by the General Assembly about its reaction to mass demonstrations following the 2009 elections, including arbitrary arrest and detention of students and others exercising their rights to peaceful assembly and association and freedom of opinion and expression, resulting in numerous deaths and injuries (resolution 64/176). This includes the trial, which began in February 2013, of Saeid Mortazavi and Akbar Heidarifar, judges accused of illegal detention and participation in the torture of student protestors that resulted in the deaths of three protesters at the Kahrizak detention centre in the weeks following the 2009 elections. The plaintiffs' witnesses reportedly could not submit testimony and the publication of information about court proceedings was prohibited. As a result, on 2 July 2013, the managing director of the semi-official Mehr News Agency was detained, interrogated and charged. He was released on bail after eight hours. The defendants were reportedly dismissed permanently from judicial positions and from government employment for five years on charges of "illegal detention". The top defendant, Mr. Mortazavi, was reportedly fined $60 on charges of "false reporting" and was acquitted of "participation in murder".

31. The Special Rapporteur continues to be confronted by individuals who communicate allegations of enforced disappearance, torture and summary execution from the period from 1980 to 1990. A number of individuals, including members of the Mourning Mothers of Laleh Park/Mothers of Khavaran, also continue to communicate ongoing harassment of those who continue to seek information about those who have disappeared or who seek justice or mourn for those who were executed during the aforementioned decade. The Special Rapporteur continues to maintain that he is not in a position to examine such cases and recalls that Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, a former Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, reviewed the matter and concluded that the allegations required detailed investigation and information

from the Government in conformity with international practice. However, the failure to investigate those cases continues to undermine the Government's obligation to combat impunity, strengthen victims' rights to redress and ensure non-recurrence by ensuring that perpetrators and their accomplices who violate human rights bear criminal responsibility for such acts.

IV. Women's rights

32. The Government accepted 8 of the 13 recommendations that relate to women's rights during its universal periodic review of 2010. In 2011, the Human Rights Committee recommended that the Islamic Republic of Iran amend its Civil Code and Family Protection Act to grant women equal access before the law, including in matters of marriage, divorce, custody, inheritance, transmission of citizenship and freedom of movement. In May 2013, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to ensure women's right to seek employment and to lift all restrictions on women's equal access to all aspects of university education. The Committee also encouraged the Government to adopt active measures preventing the forced, early and temporary marriage of girls.

33. The Guardian Council approved parliamentary amendments to the Family Protection Law in April 2013 that grant women unconditional entitlement to their husbands' retirement benefits in cases of death, whereas women who had remarried or were employed could previously be prevented from inheriting their husbands' retirement payments. The amendments also provide for the presence of legal advisers during all family court matters, such as divorce and adoption cases, to ensure that the best interests of women and their families are represented.

34. Of concern are laws and policies that continue to limit women's access to decision-making roles and that erode the advancements made by women in education. The Government has not reconsidered policies that result in the admission of more men than women in certain fields at universities across the country, that prohibit women from enrolling in certain fields of study (77 fields and hundreds of courses for the 2012/13 academic year) or that replace women's studies curricula with courses on "women's rights in Islam" at universities. Government officials maintain that "women's studies", as it is taught in the world, has serious conflicts and contrasts with Islam. Furthermore, all 30 women who registered their candidature were disqualified for the June 2013 presidential elections. On 29 May, the Special Rapporteur joined a number of other special procedures mechanisms in expressing its concern about this discriminatory action.

35. In its comments to the present report, the Islamic Republic of Iran contends that all female candidates were disqualified because of their lack of "executive and political experience" and that gender was not a consideration. The Government has also called attention to attempts to address domestic violence legally and to establish initiatives to treat victims of domestic violence and eliminate discrimination against women and that would allow women to attend decision-m king sessions of government meetings that address environmental, economic and health issues.

V. Freedom of religion

36. The Government accepted 10 recommendations related to religious freedom during its universal periodic review of 2010, including recommendations to ensure the extension of rights guaranteed by international law to members of all religious groups (see A/HRC/14/12 and Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1). Allegations continue to be reported, however, that, in addition to being subjected to limitations on their rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association, members of recognized and unrecognized religions alike, including members of the Baha'i, Christian, Sunni Muslim, Yarsan and other religious communities, are increasingly subjected to various forms of legal discrimination, including in employment and education, and often face arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment.

37. In its comments to the present report, the Government refers to its acceptance of several recommendations of the universal periodic review intended to strengthen freedom of religion in the country, states that its Constitution recognizes only Zoroastrianism, Christianity and Judaism as minority religions and that adherents to those religions are entitled to manifest their beliefs, "within the limits of the law", which is governed by Islamic sharia.

A. Baha'is

38. It has been reported that as of May 2013 at least 109 Baha'is were in prison. The Special Rapporteur joined a number of United Nations experts to reiterate the call for the immediate release of the seven Baha'i community leaders sentenced 5 years ago to 20 years' imprisonment — the longest sentences of any current prisoners of conscience. Persons interviewed between December 2012 and May 2013 reported that some Baha'is allegedly faced torture and ill-treatment in the form of severe beatings and religiously derogatory verbal abuse while in detention.

39. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recently recommended safeguards against legal and practical discrimination of members of the Baha'i community, including in their access to social programmes and education (see E/C.12/IRN/CO/2). The General Assembly made similar recommendations during its sixty-seventh session and called for the release of Baha'i prisoners of conscience, including the aforementioned leaders detained in 2008 (see resolution 67/182).

40. The Special Rapporteur continues to observe what appears to be an escalating pattern of systematic human rights violations targeting members of the Baha'i community, who face arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment, national security charges for active involvement in religious affairs, restrictions on religious practice, denial of higher education, obstacles to State employment and abuses within schools.

41. It has been reported that university applicants are required to profess their belief in either Islam or another constitutionally recognized religion. Baha'i applicants who do not declare their religion accurately are reportedly at risk for expulsion once identified. According to reports submitted to the Special Rapporteur, some 300 cases of abuse of Baha'i children and adolescents by teachers and school administrators have been documented since 2005, including cases of harassment, vilification and physical abuse in middle-school and high-school children. Baha'is have allegedly been pressured by their teachers to convert to Islam, and some students have reportedly been expelled or threatened with expulsion.

42. In its comment on the aforementioned allegations, the Government posits that Baha'is enjoy all citizenship rights and that they are not expelled from universities or otherwise deprived of their rights on the basis of their beliefs. The Islamic Republic of Iran interprets article 18 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which allows for narrow restrictions on the freedom to manifest one's religious belief for the sake of protecting national security and maintaining public order, as applicable to such activities as proselytizing Baha'i beliefs at universities, as they "incite sentiments leading to disturbance of university order".

B. Christians

43. Sources communicate that at least 20 Christians were in custody in July 2013. In addition, violations of the rights of Christians, particularly those belonging to evangelical Protestant groups, many of whom are converts, who proselytize to and serve Iranian Christians of Muslim background, continue to be reported. Authorities continue to compel licensed Protestant churches to restrict Persian-speaking and Muslim-born Iranians from participating in services, and raids and forced closures of house churches are ongoing. According to sources, more than 300 Christians have been arrested since 2010, and dozens of church leaders and active community members have reportedly been convicted of national security crimes in connection with church activities, such as organizing prayer groups, proselytizing and attending Christian seminars abroad.

44. The Government notes that religious affiliation is not considered during the judicial process and that Christians are equal before the law. The Government also asserts that applications for permits to establish churches are given equal consideration. The Government notes, however, that official recognition of a minority religion does not exempt its members from prosecution for illegalities.

C. Dervish Muslims

45. Muslims belonging to various minority sects, such as the Nematollahi Gonabadi order, reportedly continue to face a range of human rights violations, including attacks on their prayer centres, destruction of community cemeteries, arrest and torture of their community leaders. As of July 2013, 14 Gonabadi Dervishes were reportedly being detained in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

46. According to information submitted to the Special Rapporteur, on 15 January 2013, security forces, reportedly without a warrant, entered and disrupted a Gonabadi prayer service held in the courtyard of a private home in the western city of Shahrekord. Sources report that meeting participants were detained briefly, that authorities announced their intent to demolish the home in which the meeting was held and that this resulted in demonstrations outside the residence for approximately one month until the threat of demolition subsided.

47. The Government maintains that Dervishes are full and equal citizens of the Islamic Republic of Iran but that some construct places of worship without proper permits and that demolition occurs only because of the lack of proper registration, not because of religious affiliation. However, with regard to Dervishes the Government points out that it will, in accordance with national law, prosecute illegal

disturbances of public order and security without further specifying what those activities might be.

VI. Ethnic minorities

48. The General Assembly expressed its concern about violations of the human rights of persons belonging to ethnic, linguistic or other minorities, including Arabs, Azeris, Baluchis and Kurds and their advocates, and called upon the Government to eliminate all forms of discrimination and other human rights violations against those persons in law and in practice (resolution 67/182). The Government asserted its commitment to guaranteeing those rights in its second periodic report to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, submitted in May 2011 (E/C.12/IRN/2), enumerating legal sources and its practical efforts in that regard. This includes several articles from the Constitution, the country's third and fourth development plans, the 20-year vision for 2025 and efforts to produce hundreds of publications and organize cultural events that promote cultural identity.

49. Nevertheless, the Committee communicated its concern about the impact of State-sanctioned discrimination against minorities on the full enjoyment of a range of economic, social and cultural rights and made several recommendations in that regard. These include the need to ensure that the country's *gozinesh* practices, which place conditions on public and reportedly private sector employment on the grounds of political opinion, previous political affiliation, support or religious affiliation, are in full compliance with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Committee also raised concerns about the extreme poverty and inadequate living standards facing ethnic minorities and urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to take immediate steps to improve access to safe drinking water, adequate sanitation, electricity, transportation facilities, schools and health-care centres in regions traditionally inhabited by ethnic minorities (E/C.12/IRN/CO/2).

50. Reports of multifarious violations of ethnic minority rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran as guaranteed in the Covenant continue to emerge, however. These include infringement of the rights to freedom of movement, to openly exercise cultural and linguistic rights, to work and to have safe working conditions and to enjoy an adequate standard of living without discrimination of any kind.

51. In its comments, the Government rejects the aforementioned reports, noting that its Constitution guarantees equal rights to all citizens regardless of ethnicity, and points to its cooperation with the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as further proof that there is no discrimination whatsoever against ethnic minorities. The Government also notes that members of ethnic minority groups have attained high-ranking positions, including at the high managerial level, and that the Government has taken steps to improve the economic situation of Iranians without regard to ethnicity, including by investing in projects aimed at increasing access to water, health services, electricity and housing.

A. Afghan Refugees

52. The Islamic Republic of Iran hosts one of the largest refugee populations in the world. It is estimated that some 882,700 refugees are registered in the country,

including some 840,200 Afghans and 42,500 Iraqis as of December 2011. There are an additional 1.5 million illegal Afghan migrants in the country. The Government has implemented a number of support measures for refugees, including decisions to issue work permits to refugee women, to extend a health insurance scheme to refugees and to permit refugee girls admitted to universities to obtain student visas within the country. Some 135,000 families of undocumented Afghans benefited from temporary stay arrangements under the comprehensive regularization plan launched in 2011, whereby undocumented foreigners were able to apply for a visa for a one-year residency in the country, with an opportunity to extend it twice. The Government plans to allow the issuance of up to 15,000 visas monthly in Afghanistan, which entitle immigrants to work.

53. In 2010-2011, approximately 500,000 Iranians married foreign nationals, often Afghan or Iraqi refugees. Iranian women require government permission to marry a foreign national, and the Bureau for Aliens and Foreign Immigrants Affairs announced that marriages between illegal migrants and Iranians would not be recognized. More than 32,000 children are born in informal marriages between Iranian women and refugees, many of whom do not have a birth certificate or official status in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Moreover, women cannot transfer nationality and citizenship to their husbands or children, which has rendered stateless thousands of children born to Iranian women who have married Afghan or Iraqi refugees. As a result, many children of such marriages are deprived of educational opportunities and health care. Furthermore, up to 70 per cent of street children in Tehran are foreigners. Many street children are forced by their parents to beg or to work. In response, authorities have threatened to revoke the residency permits of those parents, which would strip them of their ability to legally reside in the country.

54. In August 2012, the Ministry of Science, which is responsible for administering access to higher education, published a list of provinces and cities in which foreign nationals are forbidden to reside or attend university. Afghan nationals are banned from residing in 16 of the 31 provinces and in parts of 13 other provinces, in violation of international law (see Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 5 (d)). The policy prohibiting Afghan nationals from residing in Mazandaran Province, located on the country's northern coast, began, for example, in June 2012. It is estimated that about 95 per cent of the 40,000 foreign nationals in Mazandaran are Afghans. Government officials reportedly asserted that the law must be implemented to "cleanse" the province; that the presence of Afghans was considered to be a threat to the province; and that since Mazandaran hosted tourists, it could not accept the presence of those nationals.

B. Ahwazi Arabs

55. Despite international appeals, five cultural rights activists of the Ahwazi Arab community continue to face imminent execution after having been convicted of "gathering and colluding against State security", "spreading propaganda against the system", "enmity against God", and "corruption on earth". It has been widely reported that those individuals were tortured during interrogation and forced to issue confessions that were later used against them in connection with protests that took place in 2011 and 2012 across Khuzestan Province. The individuals reportedly engaged in a dry hunger strike in protest of their torture and mistreatment while in prison. Four Iranian bankers and businessmen, including Mahafrid Amirkhosravi,

reportedly remain on death row for "disturbing the country's economic system through collusion and corruption in the banking network".

56. Poor infrastructure in Khuzestan Province continues to contribute to the limited access to drinking water in many communities in the predominately Arab province. The Ahwaz water refineries, reportedly constructed to support a population of 4,000, currently serve 1.5 million people. It is reported that water in the area is so poor that it is not usable for cleaning clothing; that Iranian officials representing the area have raised concern and called for action; and that residents have unknowingly ingested polluted water when the Ahwaz water and waste company failed to notify residents of its refinery closures or unsuccessful attempts to adequately filter water because of heavy rainfall. Persons interviewed for the present report maintained that the water in Ahwaz has a repugnant odour and is undrinkable, threatening health and for the past decade forcing residents with financial means to purchase drinkable water and those without means to risk drinking unsanitary water.

C. Kurds

57. Indiscriminate killings of *kulbaran* (border couriers), in violation of the domestic laws and international obligations of the Islamic Republic of Iran, continue to be reported. Human rights organizations report that at least 70 border couriers were killed and 68 wounded by government forces between March 2011 and April 2012. These reportedly unarmed couriers from the Kurdish-dominated provinces of Kermanshah, Kurdistan and West Azerbaijan appear to engage in smuggling such items as tea and tobacco because of inadequate employment opportunities.

58. An individual interviewed for the present report mentioned that government forces often begin shooting immediately after issuing calls for individuals to halt movement. Under Iranian law, lethal force may be used only as a last resort, and in this case can be used only after ample warning and non-lethal attempts to apprehend unauthorized migrants have been explored, including warning shots and shots to immobilize individuals. Another source reported that Pourmand Madhatniya was killed and three others were wounded by the Deputy Border Commander of Nosood in March 2011 outside a border control station in Kermanshah. The source reported that Mr. Madhatniya had been waiting outside of the border control station and had been indiscriminately fired upon by the guard during a scuffle over confiscated goods.

D. Sistan and Balochestan

59. On 6 July 2013, 11 prisoners, 6 men and 5 women, from various wards of the Zahedan central prison were reportedly executed. Two days before the execution, on 4 July, the prisoners had reportedly been transferred to solitary confinement and all communication with their families had been discontinued, allegedly to prevent the release of any information on their being transferred for execution.

VII. Landmines

60. In April 2012, the head of the Iranian mine action centre reported that 20 million mines and explosives had been buried across approximately 42,000 km^2

in five provinces, Khuzestan, Kermanshah, Kurdistan, Ilam and West Azerbaijan, during the Iran-Iraq war. He maintained that mine removal from approximately 41,500 km^2 had been undertaken, leaving 500 km^2 in border areas densely populated with mines. In April 2013, a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission of the Iranian Parliament criticized celebrations for the conclusion of the demining process in Kermanshah Province, stating that human casualties still occurred because of the lack of demining, and that the interior and defence ministers still had a responsibility to demine the contaminated areas and to protect people's lives from the dangers caused by the detonators remaining from the war.

61. According to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, respect for the rights of the child on the part of States parties includes the need to adopt active post-conflict safety measures necessary to restore and protect rights, including in areas where landmines pose a threat to the safety of children, and that investment must be made to ensure the complete clearing of landmines and cluster bombs from all affected areas.[4] In April 2006, the United Nations resident coordinator reported that approximately 2 individuals a day, or 730 annually, become victims of landmines in the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to a report published on the website of the State welfare organization, 40 per cent of the individuals who incur disabilities as a result of exploding landmines are children under 14, with farmers comprising the second largest population of victims.

62. A number of interviewees reported the absence of warning signs in the mine-infested area of Kermanshah Province where they endured injuries from exploding landmines. It was also reported that three children in Khuzestan Province died while playing when they came in contact with an explosive in April 2013.

63. Under Iranian law, victims of mines in war zones are considered veterans or martyrs and are entitled to receive rights and benefits in accordance with regulations of the Martyr Foundation and Veterans Foundation. The State welfare organization stated that a review to conclude whether a mine-related accident was the fault of the victim must be conducted by a commission consisting of several government officials, including representatives of the police and Commander of the Revolutionary Guards, prior to the issuance of any benefits.

64. A former representative in the Iranian Parliament from Ilam reported that mine victims had received little to no support for years. In a communication of June 2013, representatives from the Association of Human Rights in Kurdistan of Iran asserted that landmine victims from the town of Sardasht in West Azerbaijan Province were forced to pay for hospital expenses resulting from a mine explosion and did not receive any financial assistance from the Government to assist them or their families.

65. In its comments, the Government stated its view that landmines are not a human rights issue but a humanitarian issue. The Government is also of the view that the responsibility for the demining of 42,000 km^2 of Iranian land should fall upon the Government of Iraq and its allies in its war with the Islamic Republic of Iran in the 1980s, and that it has taken extensive steps to demine the country, leading to commendation by different bodies of the United Nations, but that despite its request, no support was rendered by the United Nations to the Iranian demining

[4] Convention on the Rights of the Child, general comment No. 17 (2013) on the right of the child to rest, leisure, play, recreational activities, cultural life and the arts (art. 57 (e)).

centre. The Government also noted that all individuals killed or injured by landmines were to be considered martyrs and war veterans and were to be awarded restitution.

VIII. Sanctions

66. Conflicting reports emanating from the country and a lack of available official data make it difficult to identify all the factors contributing to the evident humanitarian adversities facing the Iranian population. Nevertheless, reports continue to communicate an increasingly adverse impact of general sanctions on the country's economic and social welfare and raise alarm about the apparent ineffectiveness of humanitarian safeguards.

67. The economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran has reportedly been hit hard by the unprecedented sanctions. It has been estimated, for example, that oil exports, which represent the Government's predominant source of revenue, have decreased by some 30-40 per cent. Gross domestic product reportedly contracted by an estimated 3 per cent in 2012 and is predicted to further contract by approximately 1.2 per cent in the coming year. Staggering inflation, estimated to have peaked at 30 per cent in 2012/13 and forecast to hover above 20 per cent for the next three years, has had a dramatic effect on the standard of living. Furthermore, Government cuts made in December 2010 to subsidies for social welfare programmes, which contribute to low prices of imported foodstuffs and medications, have reportedly contributed to raising the costs of basic commodities, such as cooking oil, fruit, vegetables, meat and nuts.

68. Several reports have signalled that humanitarian safeguards in the form of exemptions for foodstuffs, medicines, chemicals for the production of medications and medical supplies are failing to meet their intended purpose. Reports indicate that financial sector sanctions effectively frustrate the purpose behind humanitarian exceptions. They also stress that the supply of advanced medicines, which treat the most serious illnesses, are particularly affected. Advanced medicines are produced primarily by firms based in Western countries and are subject to 20-year patents, rendering it impossible to substitute products from an alternative source.

69. In this regard, a number of reports indicate that shortages of drugs for the treatment of such diseases as cancer, heart disease, thalassemia, HIV/AIDS, haemophilia and multiple sclerosis, as well as shortages in the materials necessary to repair and maintain medical equipment, are having a profoundly worrisome impact on access to life-saving medical measures in the country. The Iranian haemophilia society asserted that some 7,000 patients were at risk owing to a shortage of anti-haemophilia drugs. In a particularly alarming case, the society claimed that a 15-year-old boy had died in a hospital in November 2012 owing to the unavailability of a blood-clotting agent. The organization also noted that the quantity of haemophilia treatments on the market in the Islamic Republic of Iran was one third of that available the previous year. Additional reports indicate that there was a 30-55 per cent drop in pharmaceutical imports to the country in 2012.

70. The failure of humanitarian safeguards is reportedly due to policies aimed at the financial sector, namely those targeting major banks and the removal of the Islamic Republic of Iran from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), which appears to have virtually cut Iranian importers off from the predominant financial channel to make payments to Western exporters

of legal humanitarian goods. Sanctions have also reportedly affected the availability of the dollars or euros necessary for Iranian pharmaceutical importers to purchase patented drugs from Western pharmaceutical companies. Recent announcements by the Health Minister indicate, however, that the Iranian biomedical sector has gained self-sufficiency in producing the raw material for penicillin G and products used to treat haemophilia, multiple sclerosis and cancer, making the foreseeable impact of shortages in medication imports on the country's health sector difficult to ascertain.

71. In its response to the request of the Special Rapporteur for its observations on the impact of sanctions on human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the United Nations Children's Fund office in the country highlighted much of the aforementioned concerns and pointed to local newspaper reports that mention the increasing number of homeless working children and elderly persons and the rise in the phenomenon of "street women". The office also reported that a decrease in funding from donors had had a significant impact on its capacity to facilitate social programmes necessary for the vulnerable populations it serves.

72. Furthermore, announcing that air pollution had approached a significantly unhealthy level, officials urged Iranians to remain indoors or avoid downtown areas for nearly a week in January 2013. Some reports have asserted that sanctions on fuel imports have produced shortages in refined fuel used to power cars and resulted in the use of low-quality gasoline, dramatically increasing air pollution. The director of air quality monitoring services in Tehran, however, denied the claim that low-quality gasoline was causing the problem, placing the blame instead on vehicle combustion systems.

73. It has been reported that the Government has taken steps to prioritize medical imports by offering foreign currency for those transactions at a highly subsidized rate. Some reports indicate, however, that the Government could have done more to safeguard medical supplies in the face of sanctions. A former Iranian Health Minister is reported to have maintained that of the $2.5 billion earmarked for foreign exchange necessary to meet the import needs of the medical sector in 2012, only $650 million was provided, intimating that the funds were misallocated.

74. Furthermore, confusion has been reported over subsidized exchange rates that appear to have resulted in millions of euros worth of pharmaceuticals being held by customs authorities for several weeks. In addition, in July, the Government cut its currency-based subsidy of food and medicine in half, although it still offers foreign currency at approximately two thirds of the market exchange rate. At the same time, the Government has promised unspecified relief for medical consumers to offset some of the costs. The head of the Iranian anaesthesia and special care association told semi-official media that despite warnings, the Government had failed to take action to avert the shortage of anaesthesia.

75. In its comments, the Islamic Republic of Iran argues that unilateral sanctions violate the spirit and principle of international law, that they result in adverse consequences against the basic rights of citizens in the targeted country and that unilateral sanctions are the main obstacles of countries to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights notes that sanctions must be subject to rigorous conditions and must be proportional and subject to appropriate human rights safeguards, including human rights impact assessments and monitoring conducted by independent experts,

and that States should adopt measures ensuring that essential supplies, such as medicines and food, are not used as tools for political pressure (A/HRC/19/33).

IX. Conclusions and recommendations

76. At the heart of the deepening human rights crisis in the Islamic Republic of Iran is its disregard for the pre-eminence of rights and standards promulgated by treaties to which it is a party. Its culturally relativistic positions on human rights result in broad restrictions on fundamental rights and limit who can enjoy those rights on the basis of gender, ethnicity, ideology, political opinion, religion or culture. This pattern is evident in the comments of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the present report and previous reports of the Special Rapporteur and other special procedures mechanisms from 2002 to 2005, in the list of issues identified for treaty body reviews in 2011 and 2013 and in numerous joint communications transmitted to the country by special procedures mechanisms.

77. The Special Rapporteur maintains that substantive advancements in law and practice congruous with international norms and standards, as well as sustained cooperation with the special procedures and other human rights mechanisms, will contribute to durable advancements in human rights protections in the Islamic Republic of Iran. To that effect, the Special Rapporteur recommends that the Islamic Republic of Iran consider the following recommendations:

(a) Narrow the scope of limits on freedoms guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination without discrimination of any kind, including the freedom of expression, access to information, association, assembly and religion; ensure the independence of the judiciary and Bar Association and also ensure that due process rights are fully observed at all stages of law enforcement;

(b) Proscribe the use of all forms of corporal punishment, including flogging and amputation; investigate all allegations of custodial deaths and allegations of torture in custody in a transparent manner consistent with the Manual on Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Istanbul Protocol) and accede to the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, along with the Optional Protocol thereto;

(c) Release all political prisoners and prisoners of conscience, including the Green Movement leaders, human rights defenders, religious leaders and dissenters, journalists and bloggers and labour rights and student activists;

(d) Declare a moratorium on all executions; ban public executions, including stoning; and limit capital punishment to offences considered to be serious crimes under international law;

(e) Expedite the establishment of a national human rights institution, as pledged at the universal periodic review, ensuring that it is fully compliant with the Paris Principles;

(f) Engage with the United Nations in capacity-building to address core human rights challenges, including issues relating to gender inequality, and accede to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the protocols thereto;

(g) Provide access to the country mandate holder and to thematic rapporteurs;

(h) Provide greater transparency on the impact of sanctions and on government efforts to mitigate the impact on those groups most adversely affected.

78. The Special Rapporteur also calls upon the United Nations system and sanctions-imposing countries to monitor the impact of sanctions and to take all appropriate steps to ensure that the measures, such as humanitarian exemptions, are effectively serving their intended purpose to prevent the potentially harmful impact of general economic sanctions on human rights.

United Nations A/68/504

General Assembly

Distr.: General
7 October 2013

Original: English

Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 138

Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations

Report of the Fifth Committee

Rapporteur: Mr. Ken **Siah** (Singapore)

I. Introduction

1. At its 2nd plenary meeting, on 20 September 2013, the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the General Committee, decided to include in the agenda of its sixty-eighth session the item entitled "Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations" and to allocate it to the Fifth Committee.

2. The Fifth Committee considered the item at its 3rd and 4th meetings, on 4 and 7 October 2013. Statements and observations made in the course of the Committee's consideration of the item are reflected in the relevant summary records (A/C.5/68/SR.3 and 4).

3. For its consideration of the item, the Committee had before it the following documents:

(a) Report of the Committee on Contributions (A/68/11);

(b) Report of the Secretary-General on multi-year payment plans (A/68/68).

II. Consideration of draft resolution A/C.5/68/L.2

4. At its 4th meeting, on 7 October, the Committee had before it a draft resolution entitled "Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: requests under Article 19 of the Charter" (A/C.5/68/L.2), submitted by the Chair on the basis of informal consultations coordinated by the representative of Libya.

5. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.5/68/L.2 without a vote (see para. 6).

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Please recycle

III. Recommendation of the Fifth Committee

6. The Fifth Committee recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft resolution:

Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: requests under Article 19 of the Charter

The General Assembly,

Having considered chapter V of the report of the Committee on Contributions on its seventy-third session,[1]

Reaffirming the obligation of Member States under Article 17 of the Charter of the United Nations to bear the expenses of the Organization as apportioned by the General Assembly,

1. *Reaffirms* its role in accordance with the provisions of Article 19 of the Charter of the United Nations and the advisory role of the Committee on Contributions in accordance with rule 160 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly;

2. *Also reaffirms* its resolution 54/237 C of 23 December 1999;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to bring to the attention of Member States the deadline specified in resolution 54/237 C, including through an early announcement in the *Journal of the United Nations* and through direct communication;

4. *Urges* all Member States requesting exemption under Article 19 of the Charter to submit as much information as possible in support of their requests and to consider submitting such information in advance of the deadline specified in resolution 54/237 C so as to enable the collation of any additional detailed information that may be necessary;

5. *Agrees* that the failure of the Central African Republic, the Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe and Somalia to pay the full minimum amount necessary to avoid the application of Article 19 of the Charter was due to conditions beyond their control;

6. *Decides* that the Central African Republic, the Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe and Somalia shall be permitted to vote in the General Assembly until the end of its sixty-eighth session.

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[1] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 11* (A/68/11).

United Nations A/68/504/Add.1

General Assembly

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30 December 2013

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Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 138

Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations

Report of the Fifth Committee

Rapporteur: Mr. Ken **Siah** (Singapore)

I. Introduction

1. The previous recommendation made by the Fifth Committee to the General Assembly under agenda item 138 is set out in the report of the Committee contained in document A/68/504.

2. The Fifth Committee resumed its consideration of the item at its 26th meeting, on 27 December 2013. Statements and observations made in the course of the Committee's consideration of the item are reflected in the relevant summary record (A/C.5/68/SR.26).

3. For its further consideration of the item, the Committee had before it the following documents:

(a) Report of the Committee on Contributions on its seventy-third session (A/68/11);

(b) Report of the Secretary-General on multi-year payment plans (A/68/68).

II. Consideration of draft decision A/C.5/68/L.10

4. At its 26th meeting, on 27 December, the Committee had before it a draft decision entitled "Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations" (A/C.5/68/L.10), submitted by the Chair.

5. At the same meeting, the Committee adopted draft decision A/C.5/68/L.10 without a vote (see para. 7).

6. After the adoption of the draft decision, statements were made by the representatives of Canada, Israel, Australia, the United States of America and Saudi Arabia (see A/C.5/68/SR.26).

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III. Recommendation of the Fifth Committee

7. The Fifth Committee recommends to the General Assembly the adoption of the following draft decision:

Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations

The General Assembly

(a) Decides that, in accordance with financial regulation 3.9 of the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations,[1] the State of Palestine, which is not a member of the United Nations but which participates in certain of its activities, shall be called upon to contribute towards the expenses of the Organization for 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 on the basis of a notional assessment rate of 0.005 per cent, which represents the basis for the calculation of the flat annual fees to be charged to the State of Palestine in accordance with General Assembly resolution 44/197 B of 21 December 1989;

(b) Also decides that the State of Palestine shall contribute one twelfth of this rate for each full month as a non-member observer State in 2012.

[1] ST/SGB/2013/4.

United Nations A/68/505

General Assembly

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Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 159 (a)
Financing of the United Nations peacekeeping forces in the Middle East: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

Revised budget for the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014

Report of the Secretary-General

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Summary

The General Assembly, in its resolution 67/278 of 28 June 2013, appropriated for the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) the amount of $50,736,200 for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014, inclusive of $48,019,000 for the maintenance of the Force, $2,277,400 for the support account for peacekeeping operations and $439,800 for the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy. The resources approved by the Assembly for the Force provided for its maintenance on the basis of the concept of operations and authorized military strength approved by the Security Council in its resolution 2084 (2012) of 19 December 2012.

Subsequently, the Security Council, by its resolution 2108 (2013) of 27 June 2013, decided to renew the mandate of the Force for a period of six months until 31 December 2013. By the same resolution, the Council stressed the need to enhance the safety and security of UNDOF personnel and those of Observer Group Golan, and endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendation to consider further adjustments to the posture and operations of the Force, as well as to implement additional mitigation measures to enhance the self-defence capabilities of the Force, including maximizing its strength and improving its self-defence equipment, within the parameters set forth in the protocol to the disengagement agreement.

The present report contains the revised budget for UNDOF for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014, which amounts to $60,775,600 for the maintenance of the Force, representing an increase of $12,756,600 over the amount of $48,019,000 appropriated by the General Assembly for that purpose in its resolution 67/278.

The revised budget provides for the deployment of 203 military additional contingent personnel and 10 additional temporary international staff.

The revised resource requirements of UNDOF have been linked to the Force's objective through a number of results-based-budgeting frameworks, organized according to the operations and support components set out in the initial 2013/14 budget (A/67/705), which remain unchanged. Accordingly, in the framework components already reviewed by the General Assembly, the present report reflects only additional or revised indicators of achievement and outputs. The additional human resources of UNDOF, in terms of the number of personnel, have been attributed to the individual components, with the exception of the Force's executive direction and management, which can be attributed to the Force as a whole.

The explanations of variances in the levels of human and financial resources have been linked, where applicable, to specific outputs planned by the Force.

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars; budget year is from 1 July to 30 June)

Category	*Initial apportionment (2013/14)*	*Revised cost estimates (2013/14)*	*Variance*	
			Amount	*Percentage*
Military and police personnel	23 376.1	30 908.0	7 531.9	32.2
Civilian personnel	13 563.7	15 310.8	1 747.1	12.9
Operational costs	11 079.2	14 556.8	3 477.6	31.4
Gross requirements	**48 019.0**	**60 775.6**	**12 756.6**	**26.6**

Category	*Initial apportionment (2013/14)*	*Revised cost estimates (2013/14)*	*Variance*	
			Amount	*Percentage*
Staff assessment income	1 276.6	1 410.2	133.6	10.5
Net requirements	**46 742.4**	**59 365.4**	**12 623.0**	**27.0**
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	-	-	-	-
Total requirements	**48 019.0**	**60 775.6**	**12 756.6**	**26.6**

Human resources[a]

	Military contingents	*International staff*	*National staff*	*Temporary position*[b]	*Total*
Executive direction and management					
Approved 2013/14	-	7	-	2	**9**
Revised 2013/14	-	5	-	2	**7**
Components					
Operations					
Approved 2013/14	1 047	-	-	-	**1 047**
Revised 2013/14	1 250	-	-	-	**1 250**
Support					
Approved 2013/14	-	39	110	-	**149**
Revised 2013/14	-	41	110	10	**161**
Total					
Approved 2013/14	1 047	46	110	2	**1 205**
Revised 2013/14	1 250	46	110	12	**1 418**
Net change	**203**	-	-	**10**	**213**

[a] Represents the highest level of authorized/proposed strength.

[b] Funded under general temporary assistance

The actions to be taken by the General Assembly are set out in section IV of the present report.

I. Mandate and planned results

1. The mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established by the Security Council in its resolution 350 (1974). The most recent extension of the mandate was authorized by the Council in its resolution 2108 (2013), by which the Council renewed the mandate of the Force for a period of six months, until 31 December 2013.

2. By the same resolution, the Council condemned the intense fighting in the area of separation, stressed the need to enhance the safety and security of UNDOF personnel and those of Observer Group Golan, and endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendation to consider further adjustments to the posture and operations of the Force and to implement additional mitigation measures to enhance the self-defence capabilities of the Force, including maximizing its strength and improving its self-defence equipment, within the parameters set forth in the protocol to the disengagement agreement, which establishes the Force strength at 1,250 contingent personnel.

3. The Force is mandated to help the Security Council achieve an overall objective, namely, to maintain international peace and security.

4. Within this overall objective, UNDOF will, during the budget period, contribute to a number of expected accomplishments, which have been reviewed by the General Assembly in the context of the Force's initial 2013/14 budget (A/67/705) and remain unchanged, by delivering related key outputs. The frameworks below are organized according to operations and support components, and reflect additional outputs to be produced with the proposed additional resources, as well as additional contributions to the expected accomplishments defined in the initial UNDOF 2013/14 budget, which are included in the present report for ease of reference. The additional contributions can be measured through the previously formulated indicators of achievements (identified by the label "no change") as well as additional or revised indicators of achievement. The human resources of the Force, in terms of the number of personnel, have been attributed to the individual components, with the exception of the executive direction and management of the Force, which can be attributed to the Force as a whole. Additional human resource requirements, compared with the initial 2013/14 budget, have been explained under the respective components.

5. In view of the evolving security situation in the UNDOF area of operations, UNDOF withdrew temporarily from 2 of the 21 positions and 2 of the 10 outposts manned by the Force. With the increased Force strength and the ongoing enhancement of UNDOF self-defence capabilities, the Force intends to reoccupy the positions and outposts when the security situation warrants. The military observers of Observer Group Golan, part of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), also temporarily withdrew from 3 of their 11 observation posts along the area of separation. The remaining observation posts are now protected by UNDOF military contingent personnel on a daily basis. It is also planned for Observer Group Golan to reoccupy these facilities once the security situation warrants and the reinforcement of UNDOF has been completed.

6. UNDOF has been successful in continuously maintaining a constructive and cooperative channel of communication between the parties and in engaging them in order to prevent an escalation of tensions. To enhance these liaison functions, it is proposed to establish a temporary position of Liaison and Coordination Officer, as explained in detail in paragraph 16 below.

7. During the 2013/14 period, the Force's liaison with the parties and engagement with local authorities and the local population will remain essential in its efforts to continue implementing its mandate in a safe and secure manner. In addition, the Force will be involved in the removal of mines, unexploded ordnance and improvised explosive devices that may endanger its personnel. There has been an increase in the presence and use of improvised explosive devices alongside roads in the area of separation, exposing UNDOF personnel to risk. Some of these explosives have been placed alongside UNDOF access roads, blocking the evacuation of UNDOF personnel.

8. The current military and security environment in the UNDOF area of operations necessitates the significant enhancement of the Force's self-defence capabilities. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 2108 (2013), UNDOF will continue to enhance those capabilities in order to deter hostile acts against its personnel and those of Observer Group Golan. The deployment of a mechanized infantry company equipped with armoured vehicles is essential to enhancing the self-defence capabilities of the Force.

9. The Force has also developed a mission support plan, entitled "Staying in Syria", which outlines how it intends to enhance its support services for the reinforcement of the troops, as authorized by the Security Council in resolution 2108 (2013). The concept of operations and the five implementation phases of the plan are further explained in paragraph 19 of the present report.

10. As reflected in paragraph 12 of the initial 2013/14 budget (A/67/705), UNDOF must be prepared for a situation in which, as a result of the fragile security situation in the mission area, support from vendors, contractors and staff is disrupted. With the deterioration in the current situation, the security threat to Camp Faouar has been assessed as very high. Electricity and other utilities have become increasingly unreliable, as the front line between the parties is 6 km from Camp Faouar and movement between Damascus, Camp Faouar and Camp Ziouani has become increasingly limited owing to combat operations. In order to enable the continued implementation of the Force's mandate in an increasingly fragile situation, it is necessary for UNDOF to switch to alternate support modalities. UNDOF has relocated support-related functions that can no longer be performed in Camp Faouar to Camp Ziouani, as well as relocating 31 administrative functions (30 performed by national staff and 1 by international staff) that must be carried out in the Syrian Arab Republic from Camp Faouar to Damascus in order to mitigate security risks to UNDOF personnel, minimize the security risks associated with the daily commute by civilian staff between Damascus and Camp Faouar and enable continued support to be provided to the Office of the Joint Special Representative of the United Nations and the League of Arab States for Syria in Damascus.

11. In order to ensure the continuity of financial operations in the event of a security incident affecting the Force headquarters on the Beta side, UNDOF has established a finance office in Camp Ziouani to manage financial transactions and maintain accountability, and opened a bank account on the Alpha side for the timely disbursement of payments to military contingent personnel, military staff officers, civilian personnel and vendors in a safer environment. In addition, a human resources office has been established in Camp Ziouani so that records on the staff, their dependents and next of kin, as well as DNA records, can be held in a more secure environment and rapid casualty notification and identification procedures can be activated in the event of a security incident.

12. Owing to the increasingly volatile security environment attributable to the ongoing conflict in the Beta side, armoured vehicles are used for all operational movements within the areas of operations. In order to provide regular maintenance and ensure the continued availability of spare parts for these vehicles, a vehicle maintenance workshop has been established in Camp Ziouani.

13. In light of an incident in November 2012 in which a troop rotation being carried out by external contractors came under fire en route to the airport in Damascus, UNDOF has shifted the conduct of its troop rotations from Damascus to Beirut and abandoned outsourcing in favour of internal management through the newly established movement control office. In addition, all deliveries of goods and supplies have now been switched from Latakia to Beirut or Haifa and Tel Aviv.

14. The shift in active support functions from a single location, Camp Faouar, to two additional locations, Camp Ziouani and the representational office in Damascus, would require the establishment of five international temporary positions, as explained in detail in paragraphs 25 to 29 below. In addition, it is proposed to establish four temporary Security Officer positions in the Security Office to strengthen the capacity of the Force and to ensure the safety and security of UNDOF personnel and property.

Executive direction and management

15. Overall mission direction and management are to be provided by the immediate Office of the Force Commander/Head of Mission.

Table 1
Human resources: executive direction and management

	International staff								
	USG-ASG	*D-2–D-1*	*P-5–P-4*	*P-3–P-2*	*Field service*	***Subtotal***	*National staff*	*United Nations Volunteers*	***Total***
Office of the Force Commander/ Head of Mission									
Approved posts 2013/14	1	-	1	4	1	**7**	-	-	**7**
Revised posts 2013/14	1	-	1	2	1	**5**	-	-	**5**
Net change	-	-	-	**(2)**	-	**(2)**	-	-	**(2)**
Approved temporary positions[a] 2013/14	-	-	1	1	-	**2**	-	-	**2**
Revised temporary positions[a] 2013/14	-	-	2	-	-	**2**	-	-	**2**
Net change	-	-	**1**	**(1)**	-	-	-	-	-
Total									
Approved 2013/14	1	-	2	5	1	**9**	-	-	**9**
Revised 2013/14	1	-	3	2	1	**7**	-	-	**7**
Net change	-	-	1	(3)	-	**(2)**	-	-	**(2)**

[a] Funded under general temporary assistance.

Office of the Force Commander

International staff: decrease of two posts

16. In light of the ongoing security situation, it is proposed to establish a temporary position of Liaison and Coordination Officer (P-4) in the mission liaison office, which is currently staffed by three military staff officers, four military warrant officers and two contingent soldiers. The incumbent will be responsible for overseeing and guiding the maintenance of daily liaison between the parties to the disengagement agreement and will

ensure that the Head of Mission is kept abreast of all developments and provide him with strategic and operational advice on all liaison matters. He or she will directly support the Force Commander and guide a team of military liaison personnel that will maintain close contact, including daily interaction and almost daily in-person meetings, with designated Syrian and Israeli liaison counterparts. Liaison between and with the parties deals with military-operational issues on the ground, including mission-critical crossing procedures; the smooth functioning of logistics chains into and across the UNDOF area of operations; humanitarian assistance; and sensitive diplomatic-level engagement. The incumbent would ensure continuity and professionalism in the Force's engagement with the designated liaison personnel of the parties, which cannot be achieved to the same and necessary degree by military officers on 6- to 12-month rotations. The incumbent would also provide UNDOF with the necessary level of experience and expertise commensurate with the very sensitive operational environment, in which the liaison channel has assumed critical importance in maintaining the disengagement agreement and the ceasefire between the parties. Thorough institutional knowledge and a long-term view of the Force's engagement with the parties are essential to achieving the required level of consistency of the liaison functions. Liaison also requires an in-depth understanding of the underlying conflict, a thorough knowledge of the interests, constraints and modus operandi of the parties and, foremost, a relationship of mutual trust, particularly in the context of the ongoing crisis situation in the mission area, for which a staff member with a specific skill set is required. The Liaison and Coordination Officer would also maintain contacts and coordinate, as necessary, with counterparts from the other peacekeeping operations in the region (UNTSO and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon), United Nations entities such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and the Office of the Joint Special Representative in Damascus, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

17. In accordance with the results-based budgeting methodology for the presentation of Force-wide security support, two posts of Security Officer (P-3) and one international temporary position of Security Information Analyst (P-3) in the Security Office, which were previously reflected under the Office of the Force Commander in the initial 2013/14 budget, are now reflected under the support component frameworks.

Component 1: operations

18. The Force will continue to exercise responsibility for the maintenance of the ceasefire in the area of separation by means of fixed positions and patrols to ascertain that military forces of either party do not breach the area of separation. In order to ensure effective implementation of its mandate, UNDOF intends to further enhance its monitoring and observation activities and expand its night operations by improving its observation and night vision equipment, which will increase the Force's effectiveness in observing and recording violations. In view of the security incidents in the area of operations, UNDOF plans to deploy a force reserve company (mechanized infantry) equipped with armoured vehicles to deter hostile activities and to ensure the Force's self-defence capabilities. UNDOF will expand local-level liaison to enhance understanding and awareness of its mandate and activities. The Office of the Force Commander/Head of Mission will continue to liaise with the parties in order to help maintain stability in the area of separation, especially on occasions when the situation in the area of operations involves firing across the Alpha line. The Force will continue to secure and provide escorts for the passage of civilians crossing the area of separation conducted by ICRC for humanitarian purposes. The Force will also undertake the clearance of mines, unexploded ordnance and improvised explosive devices from the area of separation to ensure the safety of the Force personnel during patrols.

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
1.1 The parties act in accordance with and comply with the disengagement agreement	1.1.1 No change

Additional or revised outputs

- Weekly meetings (on average) with the parties to the disengagement agreement to de-escalate tensions resulting from repeated incidents of firing by the parties across the Alpha line owing to the civil conflict in the country and to discuss measures that both parties can take to prevent such incidents
- 23,360 troop-manned observation post and position person-days (2 troops x 32 observation posts and positions x 365 days)

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
1.2 Reduced threat of mines in the area of separation	1.2.1 No change

Outputs

- No change

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
1.3 Increased awareness of the UNDOF mandate by the civilian population	1.3.1 No change

Outputs

- No change

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
1.4 Prevention of hostile action against the Force in the area of operations by all armed groups	1.4.1 No hostile action against UNDOF positions or patrols (2011/12: 2 incidents; 2012/13: 7 incidents; 2013/14: no incidents)

Additional outputs

- Reoccupation of two positions, two outposts and three observation posts from which UNDOF and Observer Group Golan withdrew owing to hostile action
- Provision of UNDOF armed guards to six Bravo-side observation posts of Observer Group Golan

Additional outputs
• 30,660 force reserve company deterrent patrol days (28 x 3 platoons x 365 days) in armoured fighting vehicles in areas of conflict
• Daily monitoring and analyses of the areas of conflict and tension within the area of operations in order to ensure the security of UNDOF and Observer Group Golan personnel and properties

External factors
No change

Table 2
Human resources: component 1, operations

Category	*Total*
Military contingents	
Approved 2013/14	**1 047**
Revised 2013/14	**1 250**
Net change	**203**

Component 2: support

19. Support will be provided to the increased authorized strength of 1,250 military contingent personnel as well as to the proposed civilian staffing establishment of 58 international and 110 national staff. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 2108 (2013), in which the Council stressed the need to enhance the safety and security of the personnel of the Force, including those of Observer Group Golan, and endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendation in this regard (see paragraph 2 above), the Force has developed a mission support plan named "Staying in Syria". The plan outlines how the Force intends to effectively support the troop reinforcement. The concept of operations and the five implementation phases of the plan are as follows. In phase 1, infrastructure preparation (April to July 2013), the existing infrastructure of the Force would be upgraded to support the reinforcement of troops. An alternate headquarters would be established in Camp Ziouani and an administrative office would be established in Damascus. In phase 2, deployment (July to October 2013), one battalion would be replaced by the contingents from two contributors and one mechanized contingent unit would deploy as a force reserve. In phase 3, integration (October 2013 to January 2014), the new units would be deployed and trained in the use of United Nations-owned equipment and in UNDOF procedures and operations. Work would begin on the additional required facilities for accommodation, ammunition storage and vehicle maintenance and repair. In phase 4, full operations with interim support (January to June 2014), the new units would be fully operational but the work on the provision of the additional facilities would continue. Therefore, interim support measures would be required. In phase 5, full operations with efficient support (July 2014), all additional support requirements would have been provided and support would reach full efficiency.

Expected accomplishments	*Indicators of achievement*
2.1 Efficient and effective logistical, administrative and security support to the Force	2.1.1–2.1.4 No change
	2.1.5 Full implementation of the business continuity plan

Additional outputs

Service improvements

- Establishment of the Force's back-up office at Camp Ziouani (Alpha side) to perform critical finance and banking functions to ensure timely payments to military and civilian personnel as well as vendors and to perform human resource functions, including the maintenance of personnel records to enable rapid casualty notification and identification procedures in the event of a security incident, in a secure environment
- Relocation of an administrative office from Camp Faouar (the headquarters of the Force) to Damascus in order to enable support continuity in finance/banking services, procurement, vendors, logistics, shipments and movements between Beirut air and sea ports and Damascus and to enable continued support to the Office of the Joint Special Representative of the United Nations and the League of Arab States for Syria in Damascus while minimizing the security risks of daily personnel commuting between Damascus and the Camp Faouar

Military, police and civilian personnel

- Emplacement, rotation and repatriation of an average of 1,250 military contingent personnel
- Verification, monitoring and inspection of contingent-owned equipment in respect of an average of 1,250 military contingent personnel
- Administration of an average of 58 international and 110 national staff

Facilities and infrastructure

- Refurbishment of 3 buildings in Camp Faouar for the accommodation of the 203 additional military contingent personnel
- Construction of a freezer room for the kitchen in Camp Ziouani to accommodate additional rations for the 203 additional military contingent personnel
- Construction of a heavy-duty vehicle transport workshop in Camp Ziouani for the maintenance of armoured fighting vehicles
- Construction of two storage facilities to accommodate the increase in ammunition holdings

Additional outputs

Ground transportation

- Operation and maintenance of 408 United Nations-owned vehicles, including 106 armoured vehicles and 23 contingent-owned vehicles through 5 workshops in 2 locations

Security

- Provision of security advice and situation analysis to the senior leadership of the Force
- Conduct of 4,375 hours of training for all military and civilian personnel on convoy procedures and actions involving improvised explosive devices; awareness and use of nuclear, biological and chemical kits; shelter procedures and camp protection; induction training; fire drills; and abduction/hostage incident awareness
- Provision of security support to UNDOF convoys between Camp Faouar and Damascus and between Damascus and Beirut in light of the designation of Beirut as the new induction point for UNDOF personnel
- Provision of recommendations to the Force Commander on the enhancement of the physical security posture for Camp Faouar, Camp Ziouani, the representational office in Damascus and UNDOF positions in light of the current security situation
- Improvement in security monitoring and situational analysis and enhancement of the warden system in Damascus, where the majority of the national staff reside and work, and representing UNDOF in the meetings of the security management team of the Department of Safety and Security in the Syrian Arab Republic

External factors

No change

Table 3
Human resources: component 2, support

	International staff								
	USG–ASG	*D-2–D-1*	*P-5–P-4*	*P-3–P-2*	*Field Service*	***Subtotal***	*National staff*[a]	*United Nations Volunteers*	***Total***
Security Office									
Approved posts 2013/14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Revised posts 2013/14	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	-	2
Net change	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	-	2
Approved temporary positions[b] 2013/14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Proposed temporary positions[b] 2013/14	-	-	1	1	3	5	-	-	5
Net change	-	-	1	1	3	5	-	-	5

	International staff								
	USG–ASG	*D-2–D-1*	*P-5–P-4*	*P-3–P-2*	*Field Service*	***Subtotal***	*National staff*[a]	*United Nations Volunteers*	***Total***
Subtotal									
Approved 2013/14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Revised 2013/14	-	-	1	3	3	7	-	-	7
Net change	-	-	1	3	3	7	-	-	7
Mission Support Division									
Approved posts 2013/14	-	1	2	2	10	15	45	-	60
Revised posts 2013/14	-	1	2	2	10	15	45	-	60
Net change	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Approved temporary positions[b] 2013/14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Proposed temporary positions[b] 2013/14	-	-	-	1	2	3	-	-	3
Net change	-	-	-	1	2	3	-	-	3
Subtotal									
Approved posts 2013/14	-	1	2	2	10	15	45	-	60
Revised posts 2013/14	-	1	2	3	12	18	45	-	63
Net change	-	-	-	1	2	3	-	-	3
Integrated Support Services									
Approved posts 2013/14	-	-	2	1	9	12	54	-	66
Revised posts 2013/14	-	-	2	1	9	12	54	-	66
Net change	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Approved temporary positions[b] 2013/14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Revised temporary positions[b] 2013/14	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	2
Net change	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	2
Subtotal									
Approved 2013/14	-	-	2	1	9	12	54	-	66
Revised 2013/14	-	-	2	1	11	14	54	-	68
Net change	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	2
Regional Information and Communications Technology Services									
Approved posts 2013/14	-	-	1	-	11	12	11	-	23
Revised posts 2013/14	-	-	1	-	11	12	11	-	23
Net change	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

	International staff								
	USG–ASG	D-2–D-1	P-5–P-4	P-3–P-2	Field Service	Subtotal	National staff[a]	United Nations Volunteers	Total
Total									
Approved 2013/14	-	1	5	3	30	39	110	-	149
Revised 2013/14	-	1	6	7	37	51	110	-	161
Net change	-	-	1	4	7	12	-	-	12

[a] Includes National Professional Officers and national General Service staff.

[b] Funded under general temporary assistance.

Security Office

International staff: increase of two posts and five temporary positions

20. The Security Office currently has an approved staffing structure of two international posts (P-3) and one international temporary position (P-3), which was previously presented in the initial 2013/14 budget under the Office of the Force Commander. In accordance with the results-based budgeting methodology for the presentation of Force-wide security support, the approved international temporary position for a Security Information Analyst (P-3) and two Security Officer (P-3) posts are now presented under the support component frameworks.

21. In light of the security situation and its impact on the operations of the Force, it is proposed to establish a temporary position of Chief Security Officer (P-4). He or she would lead and manage a team of six international staff (3 P-3 and 3 Field Service) and would support and advise the Force Commander on the prevention and mitigation of daily security risks that may occur in the context of the ongoing security situation. The Chief Security Officer would also be responsible for establishing, coordinating and maintaining the operational security management system to ensure that the activities of UNDOF personnel are conducted in the most secure manner. The incumbent will provide additional expertise to improve the security risk management of UNDOF personnel who work and reside in the country.

22. It is also proposed to establish a temporary position for a Regional Security Assistant (Field Service) to be based in Damascus. The incumbent would be responsible for the secure movement of all UNDOF staff between Damascus, the UNDOF area of operations and the air and sea ports of Beirut by means of organized and closely monitored convoys. He or she would provide security risk assessments to national staff and their eligible dependents residing in Damascus. The Regional Security Assistant would also represent the designated official for the Golan region and the Chief Security Officer of UNDOF in meetings of the Syrian Arab Republic security cell of the Department of Safety and Security and, as required, in the meetings of the security management team for the Syrian Arab Republic.

23. It is also proposed to establish a temporary position of Security Assistant (Field Service), reporting to the Chief Security Officer. The incumbent would be responsible for monitoring and tracking the movements of all staff and national staff dependents throughout the mission area and providing updates to all staff on the security situation on the routes in the Force's area of operations, which have become an active battle zone with daily fighting between the Government forces and anti-Government parties, fighting flaring up unpredictably in different areas and random Government and insurgent checkpoints

being deployed on a daily basis. The Security Assistant would also be responsible for maintaining the database on staff locations and ensuring that staff and dependents can be rapidly accounted for in the event of security incidents.

24. Furthermore, it is proposed to establish a temporary position of Security Officer, Investigations and Training (Field Service), whose incumbent would deliver standardized United Nations security management system training in addition to other duties related to the implementation of the security management system and Force-specific security protocols. He or she would also conduct investigations of category 1 and category 2 allegations of misconduct. The establishment of a dedicated position to carry out these functions, which are currently performed by a security officer on temporary duty assignment from another mission, would provide UNDOF with the internal capacity to conduct investigations in accordance with prevailing policies and to support the standardized United Nations security management system training.

Mission Support Division

International staff: increase of three temporary positions

25. In the light of the security situation and the risk in commuting between Damascus and Camp Faouar, the majority of international staff have been evacuated from Damascus to Camp Faouar and Camp Ziouani. However, in order to maintain liaison with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and to maintain activities related to external contractors, vendors, shipping movements, banking and finance issues, 30 national staff and 1 international staff (9 from the Procurement Section, 9 from the Finance and Budget Section, 2 from the Personnel Section and 11 from the General Services Section) continue to work from the representational office in Damascus. The work of these staff members is currently not supervised by a more senior staff member. It is consequently proposed to establish a temporary position of Administrative Officer (P-3) in the Office of the Chief of Mission Support, the incumbent of which would be responsible for the supervision of national staff based in Damascus performing support activities related to procurement, general services, transport, banking and finance. He or she would report to the Chief of Mission Support and would be responsible for the day-to-day management of procurement and finance operations of the UNDOF office in Damascus and for liaising with relevant Syrian authorities on commercial activities and civilian issues, especially concerning the provision of support to any staff members involved in security incidents. In addition, the Administrative Officer would serve as the focal point for all support requirements of the Office of the Joint Special Representative.

26. In the light of the security situation and related incidents involving UNDOF personnel, it is proposed to establish a finance section on the Alpha side (Camp Ziouani) with a view to strengthening the continuity of the financial operations of the Force, and to establish a temporary position of Finance Assistant (Field Service) in the Finance and Budget Section. The incumbent would lead a team of two national staff and would directly report to the Chief Finance and Budget Officer. He or she would be responsible for the management, disbursement and accountability of funds allocated to the bank account on the Alpha side, which now handles about 35 per cent of the Force's operating resources. The Finance Assistant would ensure the continuity and accountability of the financial operations and their compliance with the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations, in view of the risk of security incidents disrupting financial operations on the Bravo side.

27. The Personnel Section is responsible for the administration of civilian personnel located in Damascus and on the Alpha and Bravo sides of the area of separation, in addition to the monitoring of payments to the military observers of Observer Group Golan. In light of the security situation, including a number of security incidents involving UNDOF

personnel, it is proposed to establish a personnel section on the Alpha side with a view to strengthening the continuity of the human resources operations of the Force in the event of a security incident on the Bravo side. It is also proposed to establish a temporary position of Human Resources Assistant (Field Service). The section would provide back-office support to human resources operations in Damascus and on the Bravo side in order to ensure that, in the event of a security incident affecting UNDOF headquarters, all documentation pertaining to incident management is readily available to staff members responsible for advising the senior management of the Force. The incumbent would lead and supervise a team of two national staff and would report to the Chief Civilian Personnel Officer.

Integrated Support Services

International staff: increase of two temporary positions

28. The Office of Integrated Support Services is responsible for the full range of logistical support to the Force. In light of the security situation, troop rotations and staff deployments through the air and seaports of the Syrian Arab Republic are not currently possible and 80 per cent of the Force now rotates through Lebanon, which is a difficult and risky process. It is no longer safe or viable to outsource the movement of personnel and supplies. In addition, the security situation has adversely affected the ability of vendors to deliver goods and supplies to UNDOF facilities, as a result of which all shipments are being delivered to Beirut, and UNDOF must collect the shipments or arrange for their delivery to the area of operations. In this regard, it is proposed to establish a temporary position of Movement Control and Shipping Officer (Field Service) to manage these critical support activities. He or she would manage the national staff of the shipping unit and would be responsible for the safe and secure rotation of military contingent personnel, the management of resources for troop rotations and the delivery of equipment and supplies. Close and continuous liaison with UNDOF headquarters, Syrian, Lebanese and Israeli authorities and troop-contributing countries is required for the planning and execution of troop rotations. Since the national staff of the shipping unit are not able to leave the country, it is not possible for them to support the movement of personnel and supplies outside the country.

29. In light of the security situation in the country, UNDOF has received 37 additional armoured vehicles to support its operations and provide secure mobility to the Force. In addition, as the security and economic situation in the country has adversely affected the ability of suppliers and vendors to meet their contractual requirements, it is now planned for these vehicles to be maintained in an UNDOF facility on the Alpha side, with repairs to be conducted by an external contractor. It is therefore proposed to establish a temporary position of Transport Assistant (Field Service) on the Alpha side in the Transport Section. He or she would oversee the vehicle maintenance programme and manage the armoured vehicle repair contract. Currently, no staff are assigned or located on the Alpha side, so the requirement is considered critical. UNDOF would now be required to manage two vehicle maintenance contracts on either side of the disengagement area. Owing to the security situation and the ongoing requirement to support the day-to-day operations of the Force on the Bravo side, it is not possible for staff on the Bravo side to be relocated to the Alpha side or to supervise the maintenance and repair activities being carried out there. Therefore, the establishment of one Transport Assistant (Field Service) position is considered essential for the Alpha side. Prior to January 2013, the armoured vehicles were maintained in the workshop in Damascus. Since then, the deployment of 37 additional armoured vehicles to the fleet coupled with the deterioration of the security situation in Damascus has rendered this impossible, leaving the Alpha side as the only location where the maintenance can be carried out. Therefore, the establishment of this temporary position is considered essential

to ensuring the maintenance of the Force's increased vehicle fleet and the availability of the maximum number of vehicles for use by the Force.

II. Financial resources

A. Overall

(Thousands of United States dollars; budget year is from 1 July to 30 June)

	Initial apportionment (2013/14)	*Revised cost estimates (2013/14)*	*Variance*	
			Amount	*Percentage*
Category	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)=(2)-(1)*	*(4)=(3)÷(1)*
Military and police personnel				
Military observers	-	-	-	-
Military contingents	23 376.1	30 908.0	7 531.9	32.2
United Nations police	-	-	-	-
Formed police units	-	-	-	-
Subtotal	**23 376.1**	**30 908.0**	**7 531.9**	**32.2**
Civilian personnel				
International staff	8 632.1	8 632.1	-	-
National staff	4 420.4	4 420.4	-	-
United Nations Volunteers	-	-	-	-
General temporary assistance	511.2	2 258.3	1 747.1	341.8
Subtotal	**13 563.7**	**15 310.8**	**1 747.1**	**12.9**
Operational costs				
Government-provided personnel	-	-	-	-
Civilian electoral observers	-	-	-	-
Consultants	20.5	20.5	-	-
Official travel	396.3	572.4	176.1	44.4
Facilities and infrastructure	6 312.8	7 904.8	1 592.0	25.2
Ground transportation	1 690.4	2 299.0	608.6	36.0
Air transportation	-	-	-	-
Naval transportation	-	-	-	-
Communications	908.0	908.0	-	-
Information technology	732.3	732.3	-	-
Medical	411.0	377.1	(33.9)	(8.2)
Special equipment	5.4	71.5	66.1	1 224.1
Other supplies, services and equipment	602.5	1 671.2	1 068.7	177.4
Quick-impact projects	-	-	-	-
Subtotal	**11 079.2**	**14 556.8**	**3 477.6**	**31.4**

Category	Initial apportionment (2013/14) (1)	Revised cost estimates (2013/14) (2)	Variance Amount (3)=(2)-(1)	Variance Percentage (4)=(3)÷(1)
Gross requirements	**48 019.0**	**60 775.6**	**12 756.6**	**26.6**
Staff assessment income	1 276.6	1 410.2	133.6	10.5
Net requirements	**46 742.4**	**59 365.4**	**12 623.0**	**27.0**
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	-	-	-	-
Total requirements	**48 019.0**	**60 775.6**	**12 756.6**	**26.6**

B. Vacancy factors

30. The revised cost estimates for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014 take into account the following delayed deployment and vacancy factors:

(Percentage)

Category	Approved 2013/14	Revised 2013/14
Military personnel		
Military contingents	-	5.0
Civilian personnel		
International staff	10.9	10.9
National staff	6.0	6.0
Temporary positions[a]		
International staff	10.0	10.0

[a] Funded under general temporary assistance.

31. The proposed delayed deployment factor of 5 per cent for military contingents is based on the recent deployment patterns as well as the average vacancy rate of 6.8 per cent for the months of July and August 2013.

C. Contingent-owned equipment: major equipment and self-sustainment

32. Revised requirements for the period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014 are based on standard reimbursement rates for major equipment and self-sustainment in the total amount of $1,256,000 as follows:

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category	Estimated amount
Major equipment	
Military contingents	886.9
Subtotal	**886.9**

Category	*Estimated amount*
Self-sustainment	
Facilities and infrastructure	191.6
Medical	106.0
Special equipment	71.5
Subtotal	**369.1**
Total	**1 256.0**

Mission factors	*Percentage*	*Effective date*	*Last review date*
A. Applicable to mission area			
Extreme environmental condition factor	-	1 July 1996	-
Intensified operational condition factor	-	1 July 1996	-
Hostile action/forced abandonment factor	-	1 July 1996	-
B. Applicable to home country			
Incremental transportation factor	0.25–3.50		

III. Analysis of variances[1]

33. The terminology employed in the analysis of resource variances in the present section is defined in annex I.B to the initial 2013/14 budget presentation (A/67/705).

	Variance	
Military contingents	$7 531.9	32.2%

- Mandate: increase in the authorized strength from 1,047 to 1,250 military contingent personnel.

34. The additional requirements are mainly attributable to the deployment of an additional 203 military contingent personnel and their equipment and the travel costs related to the replacement of one contingent, for which no provision was made in the initial 2013/14 budget. The estimates take into account a 5 per cent delayed deployment factor.

	Variance	
General temporary assistance	$1 747.1	341.8%

- Management: additional inputs and outputs.

[1] Resource variance amounts are expressed in thousands of United States dollars. Analysis is provided for variances of at least plus or minus 5 per cent or $100,000.

35. The additional requirements are attributable to the proposed establishment of 10 international temporary positions to enhance the Force's support for the deployment of additional military personnel and the establishment of an administrative office on the Alpha side, in light of the ongoing security situation.

	Variance	
Official travel	$176.1	44.4%

- Management: additional inputs and outputs.

36. The additional requirements are attributable to travel and related requirements for two staff members to be deployed on temporary duty assignment to train military and civilian personnel in the use of a software-based system for meal planning and to train new contingent personnel in the use of United Nations-owned equipment. In addition, the estimate provides for the deployment of two staff members on temporary duty assignment to assist in the completion of engineering projects to be completed in two phases.

	Variance	
Facilities and infrastructure	$1 592.0	25.2%

- Management: additional inputs and outputs.

37. The additional requirements are mainly attributable to (a) refurbishment of buildings at Camp Faouar; (b) renovation of the rations warehouse and of the freezer room at Camp Ziouani; (c) construction of the freezer room for the international kitchen at Camp Ziouani; (d) construction of a transport workshop at Camp Ziouani; and (e) construction of two ammunition storage facilities at Camp Faouar.

	Variance	
Ground transportation	$608.6	36.0%

- Management: additional inputs and outputs.

38. The additional requirements relate mainly to the repair and maintenance of additional armoured personnel carriers deployed to UNDOF and the provision of spare parts.

	Variance	
Medical	($33.9)	(8.2%)

- Management: reduced inputs and same outputs.

39. The reduced requirements are attributable to lower reimbursements for self-sustainment to troop-contributing Governments resulting from the repatriation of a medical contingent unit. The variance is partly offset by increased requirements for medical services related to the deployment of 203 additional military contingent personnel.

	Variance	
Special equipment	$66.1	1 224.1%

- Mandate: increase in the authorized strength from 1,047 to 1,250 military contingent personnel.

40. The additional requirements are attributable to higher reimbursements to troop-contributing Governments for self-sustainment for observation equipment and nuclear, biological and chemical protection equipment.

		Variance	
Other supplies, services and equipment		$1 068.7	177.4%

- Management: additional inputs and outputs.

41. The additional requirements are mainly attributable to the acquisition of personal protection gear and training for newly deployed military contingent personnel.

IV. Actions to be taken by the General Assembly

42. **The actions to be taken by the General Assembly in connection with the financing of the Force are:**

(a) Appropriation of the amount of $12,756,600 for the maintenance of the Force for the 12-month period from 1 July 2013 to 30 June 2014, in addition to the amount of $48,019,000 already appropriated for the maintenance of the Force for the same period under the terms of Assembly resolution 67/278;

(b) Assessment of the amount of $6,378,300 for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2013;

(c) Assessment of the amount of $6,378,300 for the period from 1 January to 30 June 2014, should the Security Council decide to continue the mandate of the Force.

Annex

Organization chart


Office of the Force Commander
(7 posts/positions)
1 ASG, 1 P-5[a], 1 P-4, 1 P-4[a], 1 P-3, 1 P-2, 1 FS
Security Office
(7 posts/positions)
1 P-4[a], 2 P-3, 1 P-3[a], 3 FS[a]
Chief of Staff
(Military Component)
Military Units
Office of the Chief of Mission Support
(3 posts/positions) 1 D-1, 1 P-3[a], 1 FS
Commander, Force Headquarters Company
Operations
Military Personnel Public Relations
Liaison and Protocol
Military Police
General Services Section
(24 posts)
5 FS, 19 NGS
Finance and Budget Section
(15 posts/positions)
1 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 FS[a], 11 NGS
Personnel Section
(7 posts/positions)
1 P-4, 1 FS, 1 FS[a]
4 NGS
Procurement Section
(14 posts)
3 FS, 11 NGS
Office of Integrated Support Services
(4 posts/positions)
1 P-5, 1 FS, 1 FS[a], 1 NGS
Engineering Section
(24 posts) 1 P-4, 2 FS, 21 NGS
Transport Section
(26 posts/positions) 3 FS, 1 FS[a], 22 NGS
Supply Section
(12 posts) 3 FS, 9 NGS
Geographical Information Systems Unit
(2 posts) 1 P-3, 1 NGS
Medical Unit
Logistic Battalion
Regional ICT Services
(2 posts) 1 P-5, 1 NGS
Communications Section
(11 posts) 6 FS, 5 NGS
Information Technology Section
(7 posts) 4 FS, 3 NGS
ICT Asset Management
(3 posts) 1 FS, 2 NGS

Abbreviations: ASG, Assistant Secretary-General; FS, Field Service; NGS, national General Service; ICT, Information and Communications Technology.

[a] To be funded under general temporary assistance.


LEBANON
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
JORDAN
GOLAN
Line Alpha
Line Bravo
Camp Faouar
Camp Ziouani
FijiBATT
PHILBATT
UNDOF DEPLOYMENT
September 2013
55 OGG observation post
60 UNDOF position
Alpha line or Bravo line
Inter-battalion boundary
Map No. 3818 Rev. 61E UNITED NATIONS
September 2013
Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

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Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015

Strengthening the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report sets out the vision of the Secretary-General for strengthening the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa. It examines the role of the Office in coordinating United Nations system-wide support and mobilizing international support for Africa's development, and peace and security. It demonstrates that the core mandate of the Office remains relevant and requires support to effectively address new challenges and opportunities that have emerged at the global and regional levels in the 10 years since the establishment of the Office in 2003. In particular, it highlights the rapid changes under way in Africa as well as the continent's bold regional transformative agenda, which is anchored in industrialization, good governance, and peace and security as essential components for creating a peaceful, integrated and prosperous continent. The report underlines the need to strengthen the Office to enable it to better support African countries. It also underscores the need to strengthen the Office in order to better support the implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), the importance of which was reaffirmed in the outcome document of the special event to follow up efforts made towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals, convened by the President of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly. To that end, the report contains proposals for specific ways and means to strengthen the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa to enable it to implement its existing and expanded mandate more effectively.

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I. Role and functions of the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa

1. Following the final review and appraisal of the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s, the General Assembly, by its resolution 57/7, brought to a close the New Agenda and endorsed the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as the framework for the provision of international support to Africa's development. By its resolution 57/300, the General Assembly endorsed the creation of the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa and entrusted to it the role of coordinating reports and global advocacy in support of NEPAD. In May 2003, the Secretary-General formally established the Office in his bulletin ST/SGB/2003/6 and for the past 10 years, it has delivered on its mandate as discussed below.

Supporting the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council in their deliberations on Africa

2. Over the past 10 years, the Office has provided substantive support to the debates on Africa in the General Assembly and has organized special thematic debates with the Presidents of the Assembly on critical issues of importance to Africa. It has also organized expert group meetings and panels in support of the deliberations of Member States on Africa.

3. In collaboration with the Economic and Social Council, the Office has organized special thematic events in the context of the Council's ministerial segment to focus the attention of the international community on challenges in the implementation of specific Millennium Development Goals in Africa.

4. The Office has provided vital substantive and logistical support to several United Nations global conferences, including the 2005 World Summit, the Follow-up International Conference on Financing for Development to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus and the Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development.

5. The Office served as the secretariat for the organization of the high-level event of the General Assembly on Africa's development needs, which adopted the political declaration on Africa's development needs (resolution 63/1). It also played an active role in supporting African countries in their consultations and preparations for the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development. The Office collaborated with the United Nations agencies and other regional development partners to establish a regional preparatory process in Africa, which supported the African Union Commission in the formulation of the African consensus statement to the Conference.

6. The Office also co-organized a high-level panel discussion on the margins of the Conference that provided a platform to discuss and identify opportunities, gaps and challenges for advancing a green economy transition in Africa.

Coordinating and guiding the preparation of Africa-related reports and inputs

7. In accordance with its mandate, the Office has coordinated and guided the preparation of three annual reports of the Secretary-General:

(a) New Partnership for Africa's Development: progress in implementation and international support;

(b) Causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa;

(c) United Nations system support for NEPAD. The Office has used the Interdepartmental/Inter-agency Task Force on Africa, which it convenes on an ad hoc basis, to mobilize inputs and contributions from all United Nations agencies, funds and programmes with Africa-specific mandates as well as from Member States, African regional institutions, civil society and the private sector.

Coordinating the Interdepartmental/Inter-agency Task Force on Africa to ensure a coherent and integrated approach for United Nations support for Africa, including following up on the implementation of all global summit and conference outcomes related to Africa

8. The Office has also convened the Interdepartmental/Inter-agency Task Force on Africa to facilitate a coherent system-wide approach for United Nations support for Africa. The Task Force has played an important role in the preparation of major events organized by the Office. For example, it worked together with the Office to ensure coherent and coordinated preparation of the 2008 high-level meeting on Africa's development needs and several expert group meetings on a variety of topics straddling the nexus between development, and peace and security. The Office worked closely with the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the African Union Commission and the African Development Bank in the preparation for the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development and ensured coherent support for the preparation of an African common position for the Conference as well as for the participation of African countries. A similar approach is also being pursued with regard to ongoing deliberations on the post-2015 development agenda and the sustainable development goals. Within these functions, the Office organizes annual events with the participation of the African Union, NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism and in close collaboration with the private sector, non-governmental organizations, women's organizations, youth groups and the African diaspora.

Initiating reports on critical issues affecting Africa, in particular on the interrelated issues of peace and development

9. The Office has initiated and produced a number of groundbreaking and forward-looking reports on a variety of critical issues affecting Africa that straddle the nexus between development, and peace and security, including on topics such as the management of diversity in Africa, the findings and recommendations of which

fed into the eighth African Governance Forum in October 2012; a report on economic diversification; a report on microfinance in Africa; reports on Africa's relationship with the new and emerging development partnerships; *Africa's Decade of Change: Reflections on 10 Years of NEPAD*; and a report on natural resources, climate change and conflict: protecting Africa's natural resource base in support of durable peace and sustainable development. The Office has also produced fact sheets on thematic issues of relevance to Africa, including official development assistance (ODA), trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and infrastructure development.

10. The findings of these reports were shared with Member States during the periodic briefings by the Office to Member States at Headquarters.

Coordinating global advocacy in support of the New Partnership for Africa's Development

11. The Office has been an important voice in advocating for Africa's development at the global level. Through its policy and analytical work and convening powers, it has worked to raise awareness of Africa's special development challenges and progress in implementing its commitments and has advocated for enhanced international support to complement national and regional efforts.

12. The Office has forged partnerships with private sector and civil society organizations, including African Diaspora, and leveraged their resources to advocate for Africa. Working with the group "Africa investor", the Office has sought to raise the continent's profile as an investment destination through the organization of the annual Africa investor Institutional Investment Summit in New York on the margins of the high-level segment of the General Assembly. It also participates in such important regional meetings as the African Union summit, the NEPAD Steering Committee meeting, the Africa Peer Review Forum, the joint African Union Commission/ECA Annual Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development and other important, global meetings, to promote African priorities, engage important stakeholders, and advocate and mobilize increased support for Africa's development.

13. In addition to the above, as a long-standing co-organizer of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development, the Office has played an active role in furthering Africa's development partnership with the Government of Japan. For the Fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development, it undertook important advisory and advocacy functions to ensure that Africa's interests, as espoused by the African Union Commission, were fully reflected in the Conference outcome documents, the Yokohama Declaration 2013 and the Action Plan 2013-2017. For the Conference, it also organized a thematic session on the post-2015 development agenda, chaired by the Secretary-General.

II. Africa in the changing context: new and emerging trends, issues and priorities

14. New opportunities have emerged since the establishment of the Office 10 years ago, as have new challenges affecting Africa. Africa is undergoing a major

transformation marked by significant social, political and economic changes. In the light of these new opportunities and challenges at the global and regional levels, it is necessary to expand the functions of the Office, strengthen its activities and broaden its engagement in order to respond more effectively to the needs of African countries.

Progress and challenges in the implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development

15. NEPAD has provided a broad policy framework for African development and helped regional and national development efforts focus around key sectoral priorities necessary for economic and social development. It has spearheaded the development of strategic frameworks in such areas as agriculture and food security, infrastructure, governance and health. It has also catalysed efforts by African leaders towards economic and political reforms that have provided a strong foundation for progress.

16. When the Office was established, the African continent was lagging behind in many aspects. With the support of the Office and other United Nations organizations, funds and programmes, Africa is now undergoing an unprecedented transformation. The continent is brimming with optimism following its best economic decade since independence (2001-2011). It has managed to sustain high growth for a prolonged period with an annual average gross domestic product (GDP) growth of approximately 5.6 per cent. The continent has also benefited from strengthened democracy and governance as well as the institutionalization of a robust peace and security architecture. Africa has seen a significant reduction in the number of conflicts since the 1990s and early 2000s. While 55 per cent of the world's conflicts in 2002 took place in Africa, by 2011 the share had dropped to 24 per cent.[1] With respect to governance, multiparty elections have been institutionalized since the 1990s and represent a positive trend towards democratic consolidation.

17. More recently, with the approaching deadline of the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals, the implementation of the outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development and the beginning of the negotiations on shaping the post-2015 development agenda, the African Union has become more proactive and assertive in shepherding Africa's development agenda. In 2010, the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the African Union, the successor of the Organization of African Unity, integrated NEPAD into the structures of the African Union Commission and transformed the NEPAD secretariat into the NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency (NEPAD Agency). The integration of the NEPAD Agency into the structures and processes of the African Union Commission has given renewed impetus to the implementation of NEPAD and, at the same time, expanded the scope of activities needed to support its implementation as it correlates to many activities of the African Union. Over the past decade, NEPAD has become the focal rallying point for international support

[1] Economic Commission for Africa and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *The Mutual Review of Development Effectiveness in Africa: Promise and Performance*, 2012.

for Africa's development and the foundation for a new development partnership with the continent.

18. Despite this progress, Africa still faces a number of challenges. High economic growth rates have not translated into shared prosperity for all. Africa has not experienced meaningful employment creation, nor has it seen a substantial reduction in poverty, owing in part to the nature of its growth, which has largely been based on commodity extraction and the export of raw materials. Furthermore, income inequality has expanded to an alarming level, heightening tensions and increasing the risk of social conflict. Peace and security challenges also remain, including the urgent tasks of restoring peace and stability in countries in conflict, supporting post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding in countries emerging from conflict and supporting countries in the arduous process of transitioning to democracy. In addition, the implementation of NEPAD programmes has been slow owing to capacity constraints, particularly in conflict-affected areas.

19. The medium-term strategic framework of the African Union, adopted in May 2013 at the special session of the African Union Summit to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Organization of African Unity/African Union, recognizes the importance of seizing opportunities, including using high economic growth as a platform to promote structural transformation and entrench a culture of peace. Similarly, the NEPAD strategic framework for the period 2014-2017 emphasizes a new strategic focus on promoting Africa's transformative agenda through the effective implementation of its flagship projects, including the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa, the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme and the African Peer Review Mechanism, and emphasizes industrialization as an engine for growth, with particular emphasis on women's empowerment and youth employment to expand the social dimension of development.

20. In addition, and as part of the fiftieth anniversary of the Organization of African Unity/African Union, African leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the vision for an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven and managed by its citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena, and committed to developing a long-term continent-wide agenda for the next 50 years to build a prosperous and united Africa.

21. In addition to the support from traditional development partners, in recent years, African countries have forged partnerships with a wide range of countries, particularly countries of the South. Attracted largely by the continent's abundance of natural resources as well as its burgeoning middle class and rapid urbanization, these countries have broadened their engagement with Africa. Given their rising economic weight and share in global output, production and trade, the countries of the South are becoming important sources of ODA, trade and FDI for Africa. The African Union has sought to leverage such partnerships to support Africa's transformative agenda and in particular its industrialization, to create decent jobs for Africa's growing youth population.

22. Africa is now at an important turning point in its development trajectory. In view of the continent's potential for economic growth, institutional enhancements, the slate of new and emerging development partners and the current focus on a transformative agenda, the United Nations must widen the scope of its support for Africa and increase its support to these evolving dynamic circumstances. It must

also strengthen its support for the continent as it addresses the significant challenges and opportunities in development, and peace and security that lie ahead, including tackling intra-State conflicts and the growing scourge of terrorism; the challenge of achieving the Millennium Development Goals; and helping to define the post-2015 development agenda and sustainable development goals and subsequently ensuring their successful implementation on the continent.

23. In view of these significant changes, emerging challenges and priorities, there is an urgent and timely need to strengthen the Office, which is uniquely positioned as the only office in the Secretariat solely dedicated to support Africa in order to increase its activities and align it with the evolving needs of the African countries, the African Union and the NEPAD Agency. The tenth anniversary of the establishment of the Office, which coincides with the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the Organization of African Unity/African Union, presents a timely opportunity to review and expand the scope of the Office's work and strengthen it accordingly.

Implementation of the Millennium Development Goals

24. The Millennium Development Goals have provided a powerful framework for tackling poverty and have galvanized national, regional and global efforts towards promoting human development. African countries have shown considerable commitment in the pursuit of the Goals and have pursued bold and innovative strategies in order to scale up progress towards their achievement. As a result, Africa has made commendable progress towards several of the targets, including in primary school enrolment, gender equality, and tackling the incidence of malaria and the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Despite such gains, challenges remain. Poverty rates on the continent remain unacceptably high and the goal of food security eludes many African countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. These challenges are exacerbated by persistent inequality as well as high rates of unemployment, in particular among the continent's burgeoning youth population. Africa continues to suffer from high rates of child and maternal mortality. In addition, while the incidence of conflict in Africa has declined, recurring conflicts in some countries of the region constitute a daunting challenge to achieving the Goals.

25. Completing work on the Goals will be important for securing the well-being, dignity and rights of millions of Africans trapped in poverty today and of future generations. Unfortunately, if progress continues at its current pace, Africa is unlikely to achieve the Goals by 2015. As such, we must accelerate efforts in that regard and strive to make as much progress as possible in the remaining period. Bolder actions are needed, both by African countries and the continent's development partners, to overcome challenges and fast-track progress over the next two years. A vital aspect of this push will be for Africa's development partners to meet their commitments to the continent, particularly those relating to aid, trade, aid for trade, external debt and financing. This will require the Office to redouble its efforts in pushing for the implementation of the Goals in the remaining two years.

26. Africa remains an important priority for the United Nations. The Secretary-General will continue to ensure that the Organization further streamlines and enhances its support for the achievement of the Goals in Africa.

27. In the outcome document of the special event to follow up efforts made towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals, convened by the President of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, Member States pledged to strengthen international support for NEPAD. To that end, it is necessary to strengthen the Office so that it can better coordinate United Nations system-wide support for NEPAD, which will be crucial to the acceleration of the achievement of the Goals across the continent. In addition, the Office has an important role to play in monitoring and following up on the implementation of all global summit and conference outcomes related to Africa, including the implementation of the 2005 World Summit Outcome (General Assembly resolution 60/1), the 2008 Doha Declaration on Financing for Development (resolution 63/239, annex), the 2008 Political declaration on Africa's development needs (resolution 63/1), the Outcome of the Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development (resolution 63/303, annex) and the outcome of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (resolution 66/288, annex). Furthermore, the Office will support those African countries that launched their Millennium Development Goals priority action plans in order to accelerate progress towards the achievement of the Goals, following the introduction of the Millennium Development Goals Africa implementation framework by the Millennium Development Goals Africa Steering Group, of which the Office is a member. In the context of its monitoring role, strengthening the Office will be important for monitoring progress in the implementation of the plans and supporting African countries in mobilizing international support for their efforts.

Sustainable development and the post-2015 development agenda

28. In line with its mandate to follow up on the implementation of all global summit and conference outcomes related to Africa, including the implementation of the outcome of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, the Office will continue to support African countries in the intergovernmental negotiations on the post-2015 development agenda and the sustainable development goals. In the outcome document of the Conference, entitled "The Future We Want", Member States underscored the key priority for the international community of supporting Africa's sustainable development efforts. The report of the High-level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, entitled *A New Global Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies through Sustainable Development* (2013), provides bold and practical recommendations that will be useful in addressing the global challenges of our time, in particular the number of challenges facing Africa. The report sets out a universal agenda to end extreme poverty in all its dimensions, with sustainable development at its core, encompassing economic and social development as well as environmental sustainability. Since the working groups on the sustainable development goals, means of implementation and transfer of technology started their negotiations, the Office has assumed additional responsibilities in support of the African Group in New York in the formulation of a common African position.

29. The formulation of the post-2015 development agenda provides an opportunity to consolidate the gains of the Millennium Development Goals agenda while also addressing new and emerging challenges that threaten to reverse hard-won gains in human security and development. The agenda will be particularly important for

Africa, which faces significant obstacles in all three pillars of sustainable development. In that context, it is important that Africa's needs and priorities be fully reflected in the formulation of the post-2015 development agenda. As part of its mandate to support major United Nations conferences, the Office will assist African efforts to translate the components of the report of the Secretary-General entitled "A life of dignity for all: accelerating progress towards the Millennium Development Goals and advancing the United Nations development agenda beyond 2015" (A/68/202) and will complement the efforts of the African Union to ensure an agreement on the post-2015 development framework.

30. The United Nations has been working with the African Union Commission and the African Development Bank to conduct a series of national, regional and continental consultations in Africa on the post-2015 development agenda. In the wake of those consultations, the African Union established a high-level committee of African Heads of State and Government to prepare an African common position on the post-2015 development agenda. Once finalized, this common position will provide an important input into ongoing deliberations on the agenda, particularly as intergovernmental negotiations gain momentum. The Office and ECA are supporting these efforts to ensure early agreement.

31. The outcomes from the consultations thus far have emphasized that the post-2015 development agenda should address inclusive economic growth and structural transformation as the key elements of sustainable development. Other priorities emerging from the consultations are social inclusion, equity and the importance of industrialization in creating decent employment, particularly for the continent's growing youth population. Peace and security, human rights and good governance, including anti-corruption measures, have also been highlighted as crucial development enablers for Africa that should be given priority in the post-2015 development agenda.

32. As the Office continues its efforts to support the preparations of African countries for the post-2015 development agenda and the sustainable development goals with regard to their formulation as well as planning for their future implementation, it maintains close relations with the African Union and ECA to establish a synergy between regional and global consultations on the post-2015 development agenda. In addition, the thematic session on the post-2015 development agenda at the Fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development, held in June 2013 in Yokohama, Japan and organized by the Office, generated valuable recommendations for our work on this subject. The Office should be strengthened to ensure that global consultations are informed by the outcomes of regional consultations and to effectively promote the reflection of Africa's priorities in the final agenda. Furthermore, once the post-2015 development agenda and the sustainable development goals are finalized, a strengthened Office will be a key for coordinating, through the Interdepartmental/Inter-agency Task Force on Africa, the enhanced United Nations system-wide support needed for their full and successful implementation in Africa.

Addressing the challenge of climate change

33. The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development recognized climate change as one of the major challenges facing the world. At the eighteenth

session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Member States agreed on a firm timetable to adopt a successor climate agreement to the Kyoto Protocol by 2015. The Secretary-General also plans to convene a summit meeting in 2014 to mobilize political support for the universal climate agreement on time.

34. Africa continues to bear the brunt of the adverse effects of climate change, as evidenced by severe weather events on the continent, including droughts, desertification and floods. These effects have imperilled the livelihoods of millions of Africans through worsening food security, conflicts over scarce resources and the absence of measures to mitigate and adapt to the consequences of climate change. The recent report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, entitled "Climate Change 2013: the Physical Scientific Basis", highlights the severe impacts of climate change and provides clear scientific evidence of its link to human activity. Given its significant implications for the world, climate change is among the top priorities of the Secretary-General and an imperative of the current Five-Year Action Agenda. The United Nations and the rest of the international community urgently need to support Africa to effectively deal with the effects of climate change, including through financing, technology transfer and capacity development. A strengthened Office will be a key component for galvanizing support in that regard, monitoring relevant commitments and supporting key intergovernmental and inter-agency processes relating to climate change in Africa in a manner that would facilitate an agreement in due course.

Reinforcing the nexus between development, and peace and security

35. Peace and security are highlighted in the Constitutive Act of the African Union and are key NEPAD priorities for achieving sustainable development. The continent has made steady progress towards peace and security by intensifying continental and regional cooperation under the African Peace and Security Architecture, the institutionalized mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. African Governments have also adopted a number of common positions, including on the proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons and on the prevention and combating of terrorism and transnational organized crime. The African Union has also strengthened its cooperation with the United Nations in areas ranging from peacekeeping and electoral assistance to post-conflict reconstruction and development.

36. As emphasized in the report of the High-level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, freedom from fear, conflict and violence are the most fundamental human right and the essential foundation for building peaceful and prosperous societies. The inextricable link between development, and peace and security has been recognized by the international community as the world comes to understand that there can be no peace without development and no development without peace. Empirical evidence has shown that insecurity and violence often have their roots in poverty, injustice and inequalities. Therefore, establishing lasting conditions for peace is essential for sustainable development.

37. Much remains to be done to consolidate peace, security and stability as bases for development. Multiple factors have coalesced and have triggered instabilities in

several countries, including the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Somalia, to mention just a few. Recent conflict triggers on the continent include the spillover effect from the Arab Spring in North Africa, which has contributed to instability in the Sahel; the growing threats posed by terrorism; and the incidences of governance-related conflicts and violence arising from elections. The multifaceted nature of these conflicts and their significant impact on socioeconomic development underscores the importance of pursuing a holistic approach that recognizes the interlinkages between development, and peace and security in Africa.

38. Such a holistic approach must, of necessity, recognize that African countries are at different stages of peace consolidation and development and therefore have varying needs that require tailored and targeted international support. In that respect, the focus should not be only on countries in conflict and post-conflict countries, but also on relatively stable countries and those that are transitioning to democracy. Supporting such countries on a range of issues, including stabilization; reconciliation; transitional justice; early recovery and developing capacities for resilience; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; security sector reform; and strengthening institutions and governance will be crucial to achieving durable peace and sustainable development on the continent.

39. Measures to promote peace and security, including ensuring respect for human rights, good political and economic governance, transparency and accountability, as well as institutional capacity development, are vital for sustaining development outcomes. The African Peer Review Mechanism has been an important instrument for addressing deficits in these areas and advancing good governance and socioeconomic development in Africa. It has helped to strengthen domestic accountability mechanisms and processes using a participatory approach that is inclusive of civil society and the private sector.

40. The African Union Commission's medium-term strategic framework for the period 2014-2017 underscores the importance of ensuring that efforts towards peace and security go hand in hand with efforts towards development. To demonstrate the importance of addressing both, the President of the World Bank and the Secretary-General undertook a joint mission to several African countries in May 2013, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda, where a number of projects were unveiled reinforcing the peace-security-development nexus. During the mission, the World Bank pledged $1 billion in support of infrastructure in the region, including roads, energy and agriculture. Another joint mission will be conducted to the Sahel region, where the Secretary-General will be joined by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the President of the African Development Bank, as part of a joint effort to overcome security problems through economic opportunity.

41. Given its unique mandate of promoting the nexus between development, and peace and security, the Office has a singular and important role to play in reinforcing the interlinkages among the three areas in both its advocacy and policy work. Its distinctive mandate enables it to highlight critical issues facing African countries emerging from conflicts as well as other vulnerable and fragile States on the continent. In the light of the growing complexity and intertwined nature of peace, security, development and human rights issues, the United Nations Interdepartmental/Inter-agency Task Force on Africa, convened by the Office,

assumes greater importance in terms of ensuring coherent and coordinated United Nations support to Africa as mandated by Member States. Strengthening the Office will enable it to promote greater understanding and awareness of the nexus between development, and peace and security in Africa and enhance international support to the continent, concurrently addressing these challenges.

III. Strengthening the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa

42. In the light of the changing global and African context, it is timely to strengthen the Office to enable it to respond effectively to the evolving challenges, concerns and priorities of African countries. The General Assembly recognized the need for a strengthened approach to support Africa and adopted its resolution 66/293 on the establishment of a United Nations monitoring mechanism to review commitments made towards Africa's development needs, with the mandate for the implementation of the monitoring mechanism vested in the Office. With the growing scope of mandated activities for the Office, there is a need to strengthen it so that it can effectively implement them. The present report proposes a concrete plan to strengthen the Office in the following areas of work: policy analysis, monitoring and research; intergovernmental support; advocacy; and inter-agency coordination.

Policy analysis, monitoring and research

43. The mandate of the Office includes initiating reports on pertinent issues affecting Africa, especially on the interrelated issues of peace, security and development. This requires the Office to continuously identify and monitor new and emerging issues and trends as well as produce analytical reports in support of its advisory function. In the context of Africa's development, the continent is facing a multitude of new and emerging challenges, including inequality, social exclusion, youth unemployment, climate change and other concerns relating to environmental sustainability, and violence against women, particularly sexual violence, all of which threaten peace and security. Given the widening scope of challenges that Africa is facing, the capacity of the Office should be strengthened.

44. With respect to African development partnerships, the Office is committed to working with other co-organizers to engage the process of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development and to ensure that, over the next five years, the implementation of the complex and comprehensive outcome documents arising from the Fifth Tokyo International Conference is aligned with the priorities of the African Union and African countries.

45. In addition, in view of the scarcity of resources at the international level, the Office has undertaken groundbreaking research and analysis on the contours of Africa's new and emerging partnerships, with a view to proposing strategic approaches for Africa. This work has been highly appreciated by Member States and has strengthened African policymakers' understanding of the nature of such partnerships and how they can be leveraged for African development. Strengthening the capacity of African countries to optimize the benefits of these partnerships and achieve mutually beneficial outcomes will require increased support from the United Nations, particularly through the Office's analytical work and position as a

key voice and input for Africa's dialogue with its new and emerging development partners.

46. Given the enormity of these tasks, strengthening the Office's involvement in and support to the process of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development and similar African development partnership processes is vital for ensuring support for Africa and NEPAD and for providing important baseline information for the United Nations monitoring mechanism.

47. Furthermore, following the 2008 high-level meeting on Africa's development needs, the decision of the General Assembly to establish the United Nations monitoring mechanism has significantly expanded the monitoring function of the Office. In response to this mandate, and as a result of the comprehensive report of the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly, the Office is expected to establish a monitoring mechanism and consult extensively with a wide spectrum of stakeholders, including recipient countries, traditional and emerging development partners, the private sector, academia, the media, private foundations and civil society organizations, as well as with the United Nations system organizations, departments, funds and programmes, in order to mobilize their contributions to the biennial review process.

48. As the secretariat for the United Nations monitoring mechanism, the Office will monitor all commitments made towards Africa's development, including those relating to peace and security, gender equality and women's empowerment. At major conferences in 2012 and 2013, donors pledged resources to support peace and security and post-conflict reconstruction and development for several countries, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Somalia and the Darfur region of the Sudan. Similarly, at the fifty-seventh session of the Commission on the Status of Women, held in March 2013, Member States committed to eliminate and prevent all forms of violence against women and girls by promoting their full participation in all peace and development processes.

49. The resource-, time- and labour-intensive nature of this undertaking requires that the Office strengthen its existing complement of staff by establishing new posts and non-post resources commensurate with the overarching expansion of its combined mandates.

More effective intergovernmental support

50. The outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development underscored the special and significant challenges in achieving sustainable development in Africa. In the light of this reality, it is vital that the post-2015 development agenda reflect Africa's development priorities and, in particular, its development concerns. As the only office in the Secretariat solely dedicated to Africa, the Office is uniquely positioned to act as an interface of African concerns and priorities in interdepartmental and inter-agency processes established to support negotiations on, inter alia, the post-2015 development agenda, the sustainable development goals and the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing.

51. The Office also acts as a voice for Africa on the inter-agency task forces and working groups on security sector reform; children and armed conflict; small arms;

and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, all of which are relevant to the post-2015 efforts towards peace and security.

52. As the intergovernmental negotiations on the post-2015 development agenda begin in earnest and the Open Working Group on the Sustainable Development Goals advances in its work, there will be an increasing demand on the Office to support African countries' proactive and meaningful participation in and contribution to the process. These demands will be difficult to meet given the small size of the Office and its limited human and financial resources. The Office needs to strengthen its capacity in order to provide timely and effective support to African countries in their negotiations, including through the preparation of policy briefs on pertinent issues under deliberation as well as in the preparation of background materials to inform their negotiating positions. As such, the Office requires increased resources, including senior-level professional staff, to provide analytical, substantive and timely support to African countries in respect of the post-2015 development agenda and the sustainable development goal processes.

53. In addition, increased resources would enable the Office to strengthen its participation in the internal structures of the Secretariat that support the post-2015 development agenda, such as the United Nations System Task Team on the Post-2015 Development Agenda and the technical support team for the Open Working Group on the Sustainable Development Goals. This will also be important for ensuring that the post-2015 development agenda and the sustainable development goals take the priorities and concerns of Africa into consideration.

Sharpening advocacy in support of Africa

54. Despite Africa's tremendous strides in economic growth and its improving social and political landscape, the negative perception of the continent has been hard to overcome, undermining efforts to mobilize increased investment into Africa. The Office's advocacy function can and should be a powerful tool in supporting the African Union's efforts to rebrand Africa globally. Furthermore, as chair of the advocacy and communications cluster within the Regional Coordination Mechanism for Africa, the Office is particularly well-positioned to coordinate with other cluster members to develop a comprehensive advocacy and communications strategy for the continent that would enhance the effect of the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme, which constitutes the backbone of the United Nations system's support to the African Union.

55. An increased advocacy cluster within the Regional Coordination Mechanism for Africa and the formulation and implementation of an effective advocacy and communications strategy for the continent will require additional professional staff in the Office with strong communications expertise.

56. In addition, the Office has a critical role to play in helping to galvanize wide-ranging and innovative partnerships for Africa's development, including the private sector, civil society, academia and the African diaspora. The Office has already forged a successful partnership with Africa investor, an organization comprising a large coalition of African and non-African businesses, to raise awareness of the investment opportunities in Africa and to change investors' perceptions of the continent by organizing high-level investment dialogues between African leaders and major private corporations. The Office will provide support for the high-level

thematic debate on the promotion of investment in Africa and its catalytic role in achieving Africa's development objectives called for by the General Assembly in its resolution 67/294 and will support the implementation of its outcomes. In addition, it recognizes the important role that the African diaspora plays in advocating for Africa and mobilizing support for its development, including through capital and knowledge transfer and influencing the policies of their Government regarding Africa. A key component of the Office's advocacy strategy is therefore to forge stronger links with African diaspora organizations in developed countries as a means of mobilizing stronger and more coordinated development support for Africa.

57. In addition to establishing links with the private sector and the African diaspora, the Office will forge broader links with African civil society, academia and other stakeholders, in particular in order to facilitate their participation in the formulation of African priorities regarding ongoing processes relating to peace and security, the post-2015 development agenda and the sustainable development goals. Consultations and input from civil society and academia have already proved to be a strong influence on these processes, and their importance was recognized by Member States in the preparatory processes of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, as well as in its outcome document, which called for the Open Working Group on the Sustainable Development Goals to ensure full consultation with such groups. Strengthening the Office would further promote and facilitate the full involvement of relevant African stakeholders and expertise from Africa's civil society and academic and scientific communities in order to ensure that their unique perspectives and experiences shape the final outcomes of these processes. These links would be further maintained in support of Africa's implementation of the post-2015 development agenda and sustainable development goals.

58. Forging these wide-ranging partnerships will require much broader outreach capacity than the Office currently has. Strengthening the Office with additional resources would enable it to expand upon its existing work in that regard and help the African Union, the NEPAD Agency, the African Peer Review Mechanism secretariat and the regional economic communities to mobilize investment for their development, and peace and security initiatives.

59. Furthermore, in the light of the growing cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union in the area of peacekeeping operations, in 2012, the Office launched an advocacy platform to support African peacekeeping research and training capacities in collaboration with the Integrated Training Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support. For instance, in November 2012, the Office and the Integrated Training Service organized a high-level briefing for the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana to support resource mobilization and partnership-building for the activities of the Training Centre. The recent situations in Mali and the Central African Republic have highlighted the need to further strengthen support for African peacekeeping operations with respect in particular to ensuring predictable and sustainable financing for African peacekeeping training centres, African Union-led peace support operations and the African Standby Force. With additional resources, the Office will be able to intensify its advocacy work with the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, as well as with African peacekeeping training centres to assist the African Union in its quest to fully operationalize its African Standby Force capabilities by 2015.

Enhancing inter-agency coordination

60. One of the key mandates of the Office is to coordinate United Nations system-wide support for NEPAD, which it has done through convening the Interdepartmental/Inter-agency Task Force on Africa. This mechanism has proved to be highly effective for purposes of preparing reports, but otherwise it has been possible to utilize it only on an ad hoc basis.

61. In the light of the growing complexity and intertwined nature of peace, security, development and human rights issues, there is a need to strengthen the Interdepartmental/Inter-agency Task Force on Africa to enable it to bring greater coherence and coordination in United Nations support to Africa as mandated by Member States. The General Assembly, in paragraph 27 of its resolution 66/287, requested the Secretary-General to submit recommendations at its sixty-seventh session on possible ways to strengthen the Task Force in order to ensure further coherence and an integrated approach for United Nations support for Africa, including in following up the implementation of all global summit and conference outcomes related to Africa. In that regard, it is proposed to further strengthen the Task Force by institutionalizing and revitalizing it as a sub-unit within the Office.

62. Furthermore, the establishment of the United Nations monitoring mechanism and the need to mobilize inputs for its biennial review from the United Nations system specialized agencies, funds and programmes, as stipulated by the General Assembly in its resolution 66/293, will increase the demands on the Task Force to effectively mobilize and coordinate United Nations system-wide inputs, data and background information for the monitoring mechanism.

63. In the light of the above, it is considered important to institutionalize and revitalize the Task Force with additional resources to enhance its capacity. Moreover, a strengthened Task Force will also ensure greater coherence and a more integrated approach for United Nations support to Africa in implementing the post-2015 development agenda and the sustainable development goals.

64. The Office also needs additional resources to coordinate United Nations support for the implementation of the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union and its subregional programmes. This coordination requires regular interaction and engagement with the African Union, the NEPAD Agency and other United Nations agencies. It also requires more robust coordination with the regional economic communities to enhance synergies with the United Nations system. The Office organizes an annual briefing for the regional economic communities to share their work with each other and with the international community, including the United Nations system. This regional economic communities platform can be leveraged and enhanced to support the implementation of the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme.

IV. Resource requirements

65. The strengthening of the Office would require a total of 10 new posts (2 P-5, 3 P-4, 3 P-3, 1 P-2, 1 General Service (Principal level)), namely two Senior Programme Officers (P-5), two Programme Officers (P-4), one Communications Officer (P-4), two Programme Officers (P-3), one Economic Affairs Officer (P-3), one Associate Economic Affairs Officer (P-2) and one Senior Staff Assistant

(General Service (Principal level)), under subprogramme 1, Coordination of global advocacy of and support for the New Partnership for Africa's Development, of section 11, United Nations support for the New Partnership for Africa's Development, to augment the Policy Analysis and Monitoring Unit and the immediate office of the Special Adviser on Africa. The proposed new posts would reinforce the capacity of the Office to provide dedicated support to African countries in the intergovernmental negotiations for the post-2015 development agenda and the sustainable development goals and to support the implementation of the United Nations monitoring mechanism and the strengthening of the Office's inter-agency coordination function and advocacy and communications activities. The costs of establishing the 10 new posts would amount to $4,127,100 for the biennium 2014-2015. The functions of the proposed 10 posts are enumerated in annex II to the present report.

66. In addition to the post resources, the Office would require resources to implement activities relating to the United Nations monitoring mechanism mandated by the General Assembly in its resolution 66/293. Five consultative meetings will be organized with a wide spectrum of stakeholders, including recipient countries, traditional and emerging development partners, the private sector, academia, the media, private foundations and civil society organizations as well as with the United Nations system organizations, departments, funds and programmes. The purposes of the consultative meetings are, inter alia, to mobilize inputs from various stakeholders to the United Nations monitoring mechanism; collect quantitative and qualitative data for the report of the Secretary-General on the review of implementation of commitments made towards Africa's development; and review the existing monitoring mechanisms and assess their strengths and weaknesses. The additional requirements would amount to $338,000 for the biennium 2014-2015, as shown in annex III.

67. The Office would require resources for travel to reinforce its capacity in advocacy and communications outreach through the participation of the Special Adviser and staff members in critical regional and global meetings to engage with African countries as well as key interlocutors involved in African development to raise awareness of Africa and to mobilize support for Africa's development. These meetings include the World Trade Organization Ministerial Conferences, African Development Bank annual meetings, World Bank Group/International Monetary Fund annual meetings and the meetings of the Trade and Development Board of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. The engagements of the Office are expected to lead to increased understanding by Member States of African development challenges and opportunities, increased and better targeted support to Africa, and strengthened advocacy in support of the African Union and its NEPAD programmes and projects. Such engagements will also allow the Office to apprise Member States of current and emerging issues for Africa and their priorities. The resource requirements under travel of staff amount to $293,600 for the biennium 2014-2015, as shown in annex IV.

68. In conclusion, the total costs would amount to $4,758,700 (net of staff assessment), broken down as follows: $4,036,100 under subprogramme 1, Coordination of global advocacy of and support for the New Partnership for Africa's Development, of section 11, United Nations Support for the New Partnership for Africa's Development; and $722,600 under section 29D, the Office of Central Support Services, the details of which are reflected in the table below.

Summary of estimated resource requirements by budget section and object of expenditure for the biennium 2014-2015

(United States dollars)

Budget section and object of expenditure	*Additional requirements for 2014-2015*		
	Recurrent	*Non-recurrent*	*Total*
Section 11			
Posts	3 324 900	–	3 324 900
Experts	338 000	–	338 000
Travel of staff	293 600	–	293 600
Contractual services	42 000	6 000	48 000
General operating expenses	7 200	3 000	10 200
Supplies and materials	10 000	–	10 000
Furniture and equipment	–	11 400	11 400
Subtotal	**4 015 700**	**20 400**	**4 036 100**
Section 29D			
General operating expenses	318 000	303 600	621 600
Furniture and equipment	–	101 000	101 000
Subtotal	**318 000**	**404 600**	**722 600**
Total	**4 333 700**	**425 000**	**4 758 700**

V. Actions to be taken by the General Assembly

69. **The General Assembly is requested to:**

(a) **Approve the establishment of 10 new posts comprising 2 P-5 posts, 3 P-4 posts, 3 P-3 posts, 1 P-2 post and 1 General Service (Principal level) post;**

(b) **Approve additional appropriations in the total amount of $4,036,100 for the biennium 2014-2015 under subprogramme 1, Coordination of global advocacy of and support for the New Partnership for Africa's Development, section 11, United Nations support for the New Partnership for Africa's Development, comprising $4,015,700 in respect of recurrent activities and $20,400 in respect of non-recurrent activities, representing a charge against the contingency fund;**

(c) **Approve additional appropriations in the total amount of $722,600 for the biennium 2014-2015 under section 29D, Office of Central Support Services, comprising $318,000 in respect of recurrent activities and $404,600 in respect of non-recurrent activities, representing a charge against the contingency fund;**

(d) **Approve additional appropriations of $375,100 for the biennium 2014-2015 under section 36, Staff assessment, to be offset by a corresponding amount under income section 1, Income from staff assessment.**

Annex I

Proposed organizational structure and staffing distribution for the biennium 2014-2015



Abbreviations: GS (OL), General Service (Other level); GS (PL), General Service (Principal level); LL, Local level; RB, regular budget; USG, Under-Secretary-General.

[a] New post(s).

Annex II

Functions of the new posts to be established under subprogramme 1, Coordination of global advocacy of and support for the New Partnership for Africa's Development for the biennium 2014-2015

Senior Programme Officer (P-5)

1. The Senior Programme Officer (P-5) would undertake the review of the more than 50 monitoring mechanisms currently in place, identifying their scope, priorities, methodology, coverage, strengths and weaknesses as well as their potential complementarities with the United Nations monitoring mechanism; propose the structure and method of work of the monitoring mechanism based on that review; lead consultations with Member States, civil society organizations, private foundations, academia and the media; coordinate the preparation of background reports for stakeholder consultation meetings; coordinate, under the supervision of the Director and the Chief of the Policy Analysis and Monitoring Unit, the preparation of the reports of the Secretary-General, including on the review of the implementation of commitments made towards Africa's development.

Senior Programme Officer (P-5)

2. The Senior Programme Officer (P-5) would, under the direct supervision of the Director and the Chief of the Coordination, Advocacy and Programme Development Unit, coordinate the work of the Interdepartmental/Inter-agency Task Force on Africa; convene meetings of the Task Force; review multilateral commitments towards Africa, including all existing bilateral and multilateral frameworks between Africa and various development partners as well as commitments made by private foundations, non-governmental organizations, philanthropic organizations and others; undertake consultations with Member States, civil society organizations, private foundations, academia and the media in emerging donor countries; ensure coherent and coordinated follow-up on the implementation of global summit and conference outcomes; coordinate and mobilize inputs from the United Nations system organizations, departments, funds and programmes; coordinate the United Nations support to the implementation of the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union; contribute inputs into background reports for meetings as well as the reports of the Secretary-General, including on the review of the implementation of commitments made towards Africa's development.

Programme Officer (P-4)

3. The Programme Officer (P-4) would undertake the review of commitments by African countries; assess progress made by African countries in implementing their commitments in various areas, including economic reforms, institutional and political reforms and democratic governance, and human rights, as well as commitments in different sectors, including agriculture, food security, education, and so forth; undertake consultations with Member States, continental organizations such as the African Union Commission, the African Development Bank, the NEPAD Agency and regional economic communities as well as with civil society organizations, private foundations, academia and the media in African countries;

initiate consultation with the African Union; assist with the organization of expert group meetings to consult with stakeholders; contribute inputs into background reports for meetings and the reports of the Secretary-General, including on the review of the implementation of commitments made towards Africa's development.

Programme Officer (P-4)

4. The Programme Officer (P-4) would monitor and examine the growing role of new and emerging development partners in Africa, including Brazil, China, the Gulf States, India, the Republic of Korea, Turkey and others; examine existing strategic frameworks underpinning the engagement of these actors with Africa; monitor and track the implementation of commitments made by these partners towards Africa's development and examine the contours of their engagement with African countries, including in areas such as international trade, aid for trade, external debt, official development assistance, and foreign direct investment; contribute inputs into background reports for meetings and the reports of the Secretary-General, including on the review of the implementation of commitments made towards Africa's development.

Communications Officer (P-4)

5. The Communications Officer (P-4) would lead the communications and advocacy work; develop, direct and deliver a communications and advocacy strategy of the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa with measurable outcomes and ensure effective monitoring, evaluation and reporting; prepare communications and advocacy reports and online and print newsletters; support the Office in coordinating its role as the convener of the advocacy and communications cluster within the Regional Coordination Mechanism for Africa; liaise with the Economic Commission for Africa, the African Union Commission, the Planning and Coordination Agency of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (the NEPAD Agency) and other partners to develop advocacy messages and disseminate them; develop, in collaboration with the Economic Commission for Africa, the African Union Commission, the NEPAD Agency, the Department of Public Information and others, a communication platform to raise awareness of Africa's development issues; develop evidence-based advocacy messages and/or materials such as presentations, policy briefs and so forth, in consultation with the Director of the Office and the Chief of the Policy Analysis and Monitoring Unit; maintain the website, develop content materials to be posted and update the website; and develop and maintain contact with non-governmental organizations and diaspora organizations working on African development, and peace and security issues.

Programme Officer (P-3)

6. The Programme Officer (P-3) would provide support in conducting consultations with Member States, including African countries, development partners, new emerging development partners, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, philanthropic organizations and private foundations, as well as the United Nations system organizations, departments, funds and agencies, including the Bretton Woods institutions, and other multilateral organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the African Development Bank; provide support in mobilizing the United Nations system-wide support for the United Nations monitoring mechanism; support the coordination of

the United Nations support to the implementation of the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union; and contribute inputs to the reports for the consultation meetings.

Programme Officer (P-3)

7. The Programme Officer (P-3) would provide support in convening the meetings of the Interdepartmental/Inter-agency Task Force on Africa; ensure coherent and coordinated follow-up on the implementation of global summit and conference outcomes related to Africa, especially the implementation of the outcomes of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development; provide logistical and substantive support, as well as backstopping support, for the work of the Interdepartmental/Inter-agency Task Force on Africa; liaise with and maintain regular contact with the members of the Task Force to keep them abreast of the work of the Task Force; support the coordination of the United Nations support to the implementation of the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union; and contribute inputs to the reports for the consultation meetings.

Economic Affairs Officer (P-3)

8. The Economic Affairs Officer (P-3) would assist in the implementation of the communications and advocacy strategy and effective monitoring, evaluation and reporting; prepare policy briefs highlighting challenges, providing policy recommendations and outlining major cutting-edge trends in African development, and peace and security issues, especially within the climate change initiative; monitor major trade and development issues in the context of Africa; support the engagement of the Office with the Trade and Development Board of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and provide substantive support to the participation of the Special Adviser on Africa in the intergovernmental bodies of UNCTAD and the Trade and Development Board; provide substantive and logistical support to the preparation of the Africa-NEPAD Week on the margins of the General Assembly sessions; support the Chief of the Policy Analysis and Monitoring Unit in following up on the work of the Economic and Social Council and ensuring that Africa's priorities are taken into consideration; assist, in collaboration with the Office for Economic and Social Council Support and Coordination, in identifying Africa-specific themes for the general segment of the Council; and identify African experts for Africa-related panel discussions.

Associate Economic Affairs Officer (P-2)

9. The Associate Economic Affairs Officer (P-2) would support the follow-up and implementation of the outcomes of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development; compile and collate accurate and reliable data for the United Nations monitoring mechanism; develop a comprehensive database of all sectors to be covered by the United Nations monitoring mechanism and update the database on a regular basis; prepare statistical annexes for the reports; monitor the implementation of commitments made towards Africa's development; and liaise with relevant international and regional organizations to validate the accuracy of data.

Senior Staff Assistant (General Service (Principal level))

10. The Senior Staff Assistant (General Service (Principal level)) would provide substantive support in managing the priorities, schedules, communications and workflow of the Special Adviser on Africa; coordinate and monitor activities and work processes; serve as a communications link between supervisors and senior staff; respond, or draft responses, to correspondence and communications; oversee the work of support staff and train them; organize official receptions and meetings; and exercise quality control functions for all outgoing documents.

Annex III

Estimated requirements for stakeholder consultation meetings

Stakeholder	*Number of experts participating*	*Duration (days)*	*Venue*	*(United States dollars)*			
				Airfare	*Daily subsistence allowance*	*Terminal payments*	*Total*
Regional and international organizations	18	3	New York	56 000	20 412	3 636	80 048
Traditional development partners	16	3	Paris	48 000	18 288	1 216	67 504
African countries	15	3	Addis Ababa	45 000	14 715	1 140	60 855
New emerging partners	15	3	Doha	45 000	18 405	1 140	64 545
Civil society organizations	15	3	New York	45 000	17 010	3 030	65 040
Total				**239 000**	**88 830**	**10 162**	**337 992**

Annex IV

Estimated requirements for travel of staff

Title of the meeting	*Days*	*Venue*	*Staff*	*Airfare*	*Daily subsistence allowance*	*Terminal*	*Total*
				(United States dollars)			
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, July 2015	3	Beijing	3	27 570	2 502	606	30 678
Africa-South America Summit, June 2015	3	Rio de Janeiro, Brazil	2	18 160	1 578	404	20 142
BRICS Summit, June 2014	3	Moscow	2	13 640	2 850	404	16 894
Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit Ministerial Review, June 2014	3	Abuja	2	16 080	1 682	404	18 166
Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit, December 2015	3	Istanbul, Turkey	2	15 620	1 800	404	17 824
WTO Ministerial Conference, October 2015	3	Hong Kong, China	3	31 350	3 537	606	35 493
WTO Global Aid for Trade Review, July 2015	3	Geneva	2	3 080	2 388	404	5 872
Republic of Korea-Africa Summit, October 2014	3	Seoul	2	22 040	2 466	404	24 910
World Bank Group/IMF annual meeting, April 2014	5	Washington, D.C.	2	1 700	3 630	404	5 734
World Bank Group/IMF annual meeting, April 2015	5	Washington, D.C.	2	1 700	3 630	404	5 734
African Development Bank, May 2014	4	Johannesburg, South Africa	3	35 670	3 156	606	39 432
African Development Bank, May 2015	4	Johannesburg, South Africa	3	35 670	3 156	606	39 432
UNCTAD Trade and Development Board, September 2014	5	Geneva	2	3 080	3 980	404	7 464
UNCTAD Trade and Development Board, September 2015	5	Geneva	2	3 080	3 980	404	7 464
Africa-Arab Summit	5	Kuwait City	2	16 000	1 914	404	18 318
Total				**244 440**	**42 249**	**6 868**	**293 557**

Abbreviations: BRICS, Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa; IMF, International Monetary Fund; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; WTO, World Trade Organization.

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General Assembly

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Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 134
Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015

Consultations on consolidating the secretariat of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination at United Nations Headquarters in New York

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered the report of the Secretary-General on the consultations on consolidating the secretariat of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) at United Nations Headquarters in New York (A/68/214). During its consideration of the report, the Committee met representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information and clarification, concluding with written responses received on 24 September 2013.

Background

2. In paragraph 111 of its resolution 66/246, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, in his capacity as the Chair of CEB, to consult all the participating organizations on consolidating the secretariat of CEB at United Nations Headquarters in New York and to report thereon to the Assembly at its sixty-seventh session. The Secretary-General indicated that, owing to the extensive consultations conducted, the report could not be submitted at that session (see A/68/214, para. 3).

Analysis of consolidation of the secretariat

3. In the report, it is stated that the New York branch of the CEB secretariat is responsible for supporting CEB in its overall programme of work, providing support to the High-level Committee on Programmes and liaising with United Nations intergovernmental bodies on both programme and management matters (A/68/214, para. 9). It is stated in the report that the Geneva branch of the CEB secretariat is responsible for supporting the High-level Committee on Management and its networks, in addition to maintaining human resources and financial data and statistics on behalf of the United Nations system (ibid., para. 10). It is noted in the

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report that 19 of the 29 CEB member organizations are located in Europe (9 in Geneva) (ibid., para. 11).

4. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that CEB was established following a review in 2000 of its predecessor body, the Administrative Committee on Coordination, and its subsidiary machinery. The secretariats of the Consultative Committee on Administrative Questions (Personnel and General Administrative Questions), the Consultative Committee on Administrative Questions (Financial and Budgetary Questions), the Consultative Committee on Programme and Operational Questions and the Information Systems Coordination Committee were located in Geneva. At the time, there was a secretariat for each standing body. Following the review in 2000, the Administrative Committee on Coordination was transformed into CEB and its functions were streamlined under a two-pillar structure (the High-level Committee on Programmes and the High-level Committee on Management), with the High-level Committee on Programmes also assuming many of the functions of the Organization Committee of the Administrative Committee on Coordination. A single secretariat was established with a dual structure (New York and Geneva) to ensure coherence of support and action, to be jointly financed within the overall resources allocated to the then separate secretariats. The rationale behind the two locations of the new structure was that it mirrored the continuing practice, which worked well, with support to the management-related bodies from Geneva and support to the senior coordination mechanism and the High-level Committee on Programmes from New York.

5. The Secretary-General indicates in his report that both branches of the CEB secretariat work closely together to: (a) develop and manage an interactive information network to facilitate dialogue among CEB member organizations on enhancing the effectiveness of the system; and (b) provide Member States and the general public with information on activities of system-wide relevance (A/68/214, para. 12). The Secretary-General also indicates that CEB member organizations noted that the dual-location arrangement allowed for the continuity of working hours, resulting in the constant availability of support for members (see ibid., para. 13).

6. It is stated in the report that an analysis was carried out of the functioning and the working modalities of the CEB secretariat, in addition to an evaluation for all member organizations of the benefits of the current arrangements and the operational and financial impact of possible consolidation in New York (A/68/214, para. 14). According to the Secretary-General, the review confirmed that the High-level Committee on Programmes and the High-level Committee on Management had specific mandates and responsibilities and operated in different functional areas that did not largely overlap but mutually reinforced and complemented each other. It is also stated that the relocation of the secretariat of the High-level Committee on Management would negatively affect the almost daily inter-agency working interactions between that secretariat and the secretariats of the CEB member organizations in the form of expert working group meetings held in Geneva. It is further stated that the analysis showed that no economies of scale for the CEB secretariat could be expected from consolidation and that the relocation of the secretariat of the High-level Committee on Management to New York would result in additional direct costs for the Europe-based member organizations with regard to travel, communications and related costs (see ibid., para. 15).

7. Upon enquiry as to the indicators of effectiveness used in the analysis, the Advisory Committee was informed that the indicators were ownership, balanced representation, hosting of meetings, project management and linkages with other bodies. Ownership was described as the biggest asset of CEB. It was said that the dual locations increased the sense of ownership of the CEB secretariat by the entire United Nations system. It was stated that, given that the majority of the CEB member organizations were in Europe, where there was also a larger staff presence, the dual locations ensured balanced representation of the organizations and staff. The Committee was also informed that the cost-shared budget of the CEB secretariat did not include resources for logistical costs relating to meetings. Accordingly, all meetings of the High-level Committee on Management were hosted by CEB member organizations, which required frequent personal contacts to nurture the willingness of member organizations to assume that role, and which minimized travel costs while improving the ability to coordinate and oversee meetings in Europe. With regard to project management, it was indicated that the CEB secretariat office in Geneva managed a number of inter-agency projects, most of which were led by Europe-based organizations. The location in Geneva also facilitated frequent interaction with interlocutors on operational functions, including coordination with organizations based in New York. As to linkages with other bodies, the Committee was informed that Geneva was the headquarters of at least four major international organizations (the GAVI Alliance; the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; the European Organization for Nuclear Research; and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies) and the CEB secretariat in Geneva regularly engaged with their representatives. Furthermore, the meetings of the joint working groups of the secretariat of the International Civil Service Commission and the CEB Human Resources Network were mostly held in Europe.

8. The estimated costs of consolidation are highlighted in the report as follows:

(a) One-time costs of $300,900 (based on 2013 prices) arising from the relocation of Professional staff of the secretariat of the High-level Committee on Management to New York and the setting up of additional office space at Headquarters. Based on the programme budget share of the jointly financed CEB secretariat proposed budget, this amounts to $82,400 in the year of relocation;

(b) One-time costs could arise from an agreed termination of General Service (Other level) staff members in Geneva;

(c) Recurrent costs of $300,400 (based on 2013 prices) arising from an annual reduction owing to the lower staff salary rates at Headquarters in New York compared with Geneva, partially offset by the higher non-post-related requirements in New York of $49,200 per year, giving rise to an estimated net annual reduction of $251,200 ($502,400 for the biennium). Based on the programme budget share of the jointly financed CEB secretariat proposed budget, this amounts to an estimated net reduction of $68,800 per annum, or $137,700 for the biennium (see A/68/214, para. 16, and the related table).

9. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the United Nations Office at Geneva housed a number of United Nations-related entities within the Palais des Nations complex that were fully or partially funded by extrabudgetary sources and that paid rent. Nine entities, including the CEB secretariat, had arrangements in place granting an exemption from paying rent. With regard to the

proposed programme budget, rental costs under section 29F, Administration, Geneva, included a provision for rental and maintenance of premises, proposed in the amount of $20,526,200 for the biennium 2014-2015, in order to meet the cost of staff funded by the regular budget. **The Advisory Committee considers that the programme budget may benefit from a review of the current rental arrangements, including an assessment of whether to reflect these costs in individual fascicles, with a view to ensuring increased transparency and accuracy in the budgetary process.**

10. In his report, the Secretary-General states that it is the unanimous view of the executive heads of the member organizations that consolidation would not result in any substantial financial benefits for CEB member organizations, or managerial benefits for its secretariat, and would risk weakening the coordination of the management policies and practices within the United Nations system (A/68/214, para. 17).

11. **The Advisory Committee considers that the analysis conducted of the possibility of consolidating the CEB secretariat should have examined in greater depth the respective costs of the current arrangement in contrast to those of a consolidated secretariat. The Committee notes in particular that the analysis is based on direct costs and does not take into account indirect costs, which should have been factored into the analysis. Furthermore, the estimated costs in paragraph 8 (c) above are based on current post-adjustment multipliers, which are likely to change from year to year. The Committee is therefore of the view that this matter should be kept under review.**

12. **The Advisory Committee notes, however, that the current structure of the CEB secretariat takes into account a balanced representation of the locations of CEB member organizations. The Committee also notes that the structure reflects the historical locations of the predecessor of CEB, the Administrative Committee on Coordination, and its subsidiary bodies. For these reasons, the Committee considers the current structure of the CEB secretariat to be an effective arrangement and recommends that the dual-location arrangement be maintained at this stage.**